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ABSTRACT
“An Entirely New and Utterly Horrifying Reality”: Jews’ Perceptions of and Reactions to the
Kovno Pogroms, June 22–July 6, 1941
by Sarah S. Markowitz

This thesis examines a roughly two-week period, between June 22 and July 6, 1941,
during which Jews in Kovno (Kaunas), Lithuania, became the primary targets of attacks by local
Lithuanians in the midst of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. An analysis of eyewitness
accounts reveals that, in comparison to life before June 22, the Kovno pogroms constituted “an
entirely new and utterly horrifying reality” for Kovno Jews. While Jews knew some Lithuanians
to be antisemitic, there was no previous history of widespread antisemitic violence in the city and
positive interethnic relationship were common. Therefore, in the days following the onset of the
German invasion, Jews were shocked to learn that it was local Lithuanians who posed the most
immediate threat and not the Germans. In the chaotic environment of the pogroms, Jews
exercised agency by developing survival strategies based on their perceptions of perpetrators’
motivations and their limited knowledge of events. Compounding their sense of terror, Jews felt
forsaken, as most of their former neighbors and friends remained passive during the violence and
a few were even active participants. Studying this unprecedented episode of violence highlights
the hidden dangers of latent prejudices in society. The use of eyewitness accounts further
humanizes the terrible consequences of hate and the memory of its victims.
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Introduction
In the days following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Jews in
Kovno, Lithuania became the primary targets of attacks by local Lithuanians.1 The unprompted
violence began before the Germans entered the city and killing escalated after their arrival on the
morning of June 25. Thousands of Jews were killed between June 22 and July 6, 1941, mostly at
the hands of non-Jewish Lithuanians. An eyewitness account written later in the Kovno Ghetto
reflected that the Jews of Kovno had known “that with the arrival of the Germans a terrible time
awaited them,” and, looking ahead to what might happen to them after the invasion, they
“shuddered from the blackness and envisaged terrible things.” Tragically, however, “the reality”
of being attacked by local Lithuanians “greatly exceeded in blackness and dreadful events
anything the greatest pessimist could have imagined.”2 What did the Jews of Kovno expect to
happen after the German invasion, and why was the reality so unforeseeably horrible? While
they could not as yet had any sense of the greater tragedy that would become the Holocaust, they
had little reason to fear their Lithuanian neighbors. In the roughly two-week period examined
herein, Jews in Kovno were primarily concerned with this more immediate, unexpected threat.
Because most Jews had viewed their prewar lives in Kovno positively, the violence inflicted
upon their community by local Lithuanians was terribly disturbing. Although the pogroms were

1

Kovno is the Yiddish name for Kaunas, the capital city of independent Lithuania from 1918–1940; therefore, I will
refer to it as such.
2
Samuel Schalkowsky, ed., The Clandestine History of the Kovno Jewish Ghetto Police (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2014), 66.
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unprecedented, Jews could not be, and were not, unresponsive. They actively interpreted and
reacted to the unforeseen violence as best they could.

Historical Background
Jews first arrived in in the area which constitutes modern Lithuania in the fourteenth
century, which at that time was encompassed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Jewish
communities were established in major towns such as Kaunas-Wilijampole, which its Jews
would come to refer to as Kovno.3 Lithuanian rulers invited Jews to settle in the region for the
purpose of participating in commerce, the traditional economic role of Jews in Medieval
Europe.4 Vytautas the Great, the Grand Duke of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, officially
endorsed and protected the Jewish communities with a charter in 1388. The Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, established in 1569, became a significant center of Jewish scholarship and
culture, particularly the city of Vilna (Vilnius to Lithuanians), which was referred to as “the
Jerusalem of the North.” Although Jews received royal protections and had considerable
autonomy, they were still targeted by their mostly Catholic neighbors due to religious
intolerance, which was often exacerbated during times of economic discontent. In Kovno, Jews
experienced periodic expulsions from the city, to the suburb of Slobodka.5
With the dissolution of the Commonwealth in 1795, Lithuania came under Imperial
Russian rule. The region was located in the Pale of Settlement, the western border territory of the
Russian Empire where Jews were permitted to reside. By the nineteenth century, Lithuanian
Jews were highly urbanized, comprising half the total urban population. Most were merchants,

3

Masha Greenbaum, The Jews of Lithuania: A History of a Remarkable Community 1316-1945 (Jerusalem: Gefen
Publishing House. 1995), 5.
4
Karen Sutton, The Massacre of the Jews of Lithuania (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2008), 25.
5
Sutton, The Massacre of the Jews of Lithuania, 27.
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artisans and laborers.6 In the mid-nineteenth century, Kovno became a cultural, spiritual, and
intellectual center of Jewish life in Eastern Europe; several prominent yeshivas were established
in Slobodka.7 Apart from traditional antisemitic sentiments, Lithuania was “relatively free” of
pogroms and its Jews and non-Jews had relatively better relations than existed in other parts of
the Russian empire.8
Lithuanian nationalism began to develop in the mid-nineteenth century, in parallel with
other nationalist movements throughout Europe. The leaders of the movement, members of the
intelligentsia and Roman Catholic clergy, sought to recreate and reestablish a national Lithuanian
identity.9 During the First World War, the region was occupied by the Germans, who, for their
own strategic interests, encouraged limited Lithuanian self-rule. In 1918, after the Russian
Revolution and the conclusion of World War I, the First Lithuanian Republic was established.
Fighting over territorial boundaries ensued between Lithuania, Poland, and the Soviet Union.
Hostilities continued until 1924, by which time Lithuania lost the city of Vilnius to Poland.
Kovno (Kaunas) became the new capital of the country (Figure 1).10 The city, like the new
independent state, was multiethnic. Although Lithuanians were the majority ethnic group, there
were significant numbers of Poles, Russians, and Jews. According to the 1923 census Jews
represented 7.26 percent of the total population of Lithuania; 31.9 percent of Lithuanian Jews
lived in urban areas. The largest Jewish community was located in Kovno, numbering 25,044
and constituting roughly one-fourth of the city’s population.11

6

Greenbaum, The Jews of Lithuania, 208.
Greenbaum, The Jews of Lithuania, 96.
8
Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1987), 216.
9
Michael MacQueen, “The Context of Mass Destruction: Agents and Prerequisites of the Holocaust in Lithuania.”
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12, no. 1 (1998): 29.
10
Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars, 214.
11
Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars, 225.
7
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Figure 1- Map of Lithuania and Surrounding Areas
(Source: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)
Lithuanian nationalists viewed ethnic Poles more so than Jews as a threat to their
aspirations during the early years of independent Lithuania.12 Jews had supported Lithuanian
independence efforts and became involved in the new government. Initially the Jewish
community sought “cultural autonomy,” to have their own autonomous institutions and retain
minority rights, and initially the new Lithuanian government supported the program.13 Such
hopes were dashed, however, with the signing of the 1922 Constitution. In her comprehensive
history of Lithuanian Jewry, former Kovno resident and Holocaust survivor Masha Greenbaum
clarifies that, although the Constitution contained articles granting rights to national minorities,
these were “purely rhetorical and contained no juridical guarantee to ensure the existence of
national autonomy.”14 Thereafter, Jewish participation in the Lithuanian government dwindled,
as nationalist and right-wing parties gained more power.

12

Darius Staliūnas, “Lithuanian Antisemitism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” Polin: Studies
in Polish Jewry 25 (2012): 145.
13
Greenbaum, The Jews of Lithuania, 229.
14
Greenbaum, The Jews of Lithuania, 244.
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In December 1926, the right-wing parties carried out a coup, with Nationalist Party
member Antanas Smetona becoming President. Lithuania ceased to be a democracy, and
Lithuanian nationalism began to “crystallize and consolidate” throughout the following decade.15
Emphasis was placed on “Lithuanianization.” The national government pursued economic
policies intended to bolster ethnic Lithuanians, who were becoming more urbanized and moving
into the middle classes. This placed the rising Lithuanian middle class in potential conflict with
Jews, who had traditionally worked as merchants and tradesmen, as well as doctors and lawyers.
Despite nationalist policies which restricted Jewish participation in commerce and the civil
service, overall, the Smetona government was not overtly or officially antisemitic. Antisemitism
however, persisted in various forms in Lithuanian society. Many Lithuanians held traditional
economic and religious antisemitic sentiments, derived from perceived economic competition
with Jews or the belief that Jews were responsible for the death of Jesus. Jews were also
negatively associated with communism, especially after the Bolshevik Revolution, in which they
were perceived to have had a leading role. Thus arose the “Judeo-Bolshevik” myth, which
negatively equates Jews with Soviet rule, advances that Jews created Communism, and posits
that all Jews are Communists. In Lithuania, this conflation myth began to appear in the 1920s,
first promulgated by right-wing groups.16
Right-wing nationalism increased in Lithuania throughout the 1930s, as it also did in a
larger, more belligerent nation, Nazi Germany. In 1938, Hitler began his quest to expand
Germany’s territory. He first annexed Austria in March and then the Czech Sudetenland in

15

Christoph Dieckmann, “Lithuania in Summer 1941- The German Invasion and Kaunas Pogrom” in Shared
History, Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939-1941, eds. Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth
A. Cole, and Kai Struve (Berlin: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 376.
16
Saulius Sužiedėlis, “The Historical Sources for Antisemitism in Lithuanian and Jewish-Lithuanian Relations
During the 1930s” in The Vanished World of Lithuanian Jews, eds. Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Stefan Schreiner, and
Darius Staliūnas (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 124.
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September. The other expansionist power on the continent was the Soviet Union, led by Joseph
Stalin. However, neither leader was ready to go to war with the other, even though Hitler’s quest
for Lebensraum (living space) would inevitably bring the nations into conflict. In August 1939,
the world was shocked to learn that the Soviets and the Nazis had signed the MolotovRibbentrop pact, dividing Poland into respective spheres of influence. Germany invaded Poland
from the west at the beginning of September. The Soviets occupied the eastern half of the
country two-and-a-half weeks later. Germany also demanded and received from Lithuania a strip
of territory bordering East Prussia. Lithuania initially remained independent and neutral. The
Soviet Union, however, coerced Lithuania into signing a “mutual assistance agreement” in
October 1939, allowing for the stationing of Soviet troops in the country. In return, the Soviets
restored the region surrounding the city of Vilnius to Lithuania, which was quickly reestablished
as Lithuania’s capital.
As a result of the acquisition of Vilnius, Lithuanian’s Jewish population grew by an
additional 65–67,000 Jews. About 14,000 Polish-Jewish refugees also fled into the country from
German-occupied Poland in the autumn of 1939. Thus, by the first half of 1940, the Jewish
population in Lithuania had grown from 146–147,000 to 225–228,000.17 In accordance with
Stalin’s desire to create a strategic buffer zone against a potential future German invasion, the
Soviet Union fully occupied Lithuania on June 15, 1940, leading to the creation of the
Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.18 Lithuanian antisemitism subsequently significantly
worsened over the next year of occupation. Embittered because of losing their independence and
the ensuing changes resulting from Sovietization policies which placed some Jews in visible

17

Yitzhak Arad, “The Murder of the Jews in German-Occupied Lithuania (1941–1944)” in The Vanished World of
Lithuanian Jews, eds. Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Stefan Schreiner, and Darius Staliūnas (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004),
176.
18
Sutton, The Massacre of the Jews of Lithuania, 72; Greenbaum, The Jews of Lithuania, 291.
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government positions, many Lithuanians perceived Jews as “representatives of the disdained
Soviet Authority.”19
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, some Lithuanians initially
saw the Germans as “liberators” who would help them restore independence to their nation. This
notion had been promulgated during the Soviet occupation in anti-Soviet propaganda distributed
by underground groups such as the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF), which also called for
punishing Jews in retribution for the suffering Lithuanians endured under the Soviets.20
Lithuanian nationalists declared independence the day after the German invasion and announced
the establishment of a Provisional Government. Concurrently, Lithuanian “partisans,” members
of anti-Soviet nationalist groups such as the LAF, began to target and kill Jews throughout
Kovno, before the Germans arrived in the city. The incoming Nazis enabled and emboldened the
pogromists. German leaders had planned to capitalize on the Lithuanians’ desires for
independence and pervasive negative attitudes towards Jews. A June 29 order from Reinhard
Heydrich instructed the Einsatzgruppen that local pogroms “‘should in no way be hindered. On
the contrary, they must be encouraged…and even intensified.’”21 In Kovno, within the first two
weeks of the invasion, approximately 1,000 Jews were killed in pogroms throughout the city and
a further 5,000 were arrested and massacred at the Seventh Fort, one of several tsarist-era

19

Dov Levin, “On the Relations between the Baltic Peoples and Their Jewish Neighbors Before, During and After
World War II,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5, no. 1 (1990): 55.
20
Following the Soviet Occupation, several right-wing Lithuanians fled to Germany and established the LAF in
Berlin in November 1940. The group was led by Colonel Škirpa, who had been the Lithuanian ambassador to
Germany. The group’s goal was to restore Lithuanian independence, and they believed their best chance would be
following Germany’s impending invasion of the Soviet Union.
21
Christoph Dieckmann and Saulius Sužiedėlis, The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews During
Summer and Fall of 1941: Sources and Analysis (Vilnius: Margi Raštai, 2006), 110.
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defensive structures located outside the city (Figure 2).22 My work focuses on Jews’ experience
of this initial period of violence, instigated and primarily perpetrated by local Lithuanians.

Figure 2- Map of Kovno and Key Locations
(Source: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)
In July, a German military administration was established, which was replaced by a
civilian administration in August, the Reichkommissarrat Ostland. Subsequently, the short-lived
Lithuanian Provisional Government was dissolved. Throughout the summer, Einsatzgruppen
units carried out mass killings throughout Lithuania, mostly in the provincial areas, and Ghettos
were established in the large Lithuanian cities, including Kovno. Closed on August 15, the
Kovno Ghetto was grossly overcrowded with 30,000 captive Jews. In fall 1941, the Ghetto
population was subjected to a series of “Aktionen” (actions), selections of those to be murdered.
Approximately 10,000 individuals were shot in the “Great Action” on October 29. In total, it is
estimated that 90 percent of the entire Jewish population of Lithuania was murdered during the

22

Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews,137.
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Holocaust. About 80 percent of Lithuanian Jews were murdered within the first six months, by
December 1941.23 Only 3,000–3,500 Kovno Jews survived the war.24

Research Motivations and Intentions
Most scholarship on the Holocaust in Lithuania only briefly touches on the initial period
of violence following the German invasion, before the mass murders began across Lithuania and
Ghettos were established in the major cities. More so, it is often discussed as a “prelude” to the
Final Solution or as foreshadowing subsequent Lithuanian collaboration with the Nazi occupiers
and participation in Einsatzgruppen units. Such a characterization reduces the significance of this
period as pivotal in itself, one which must be understood regardless of the greater tragedies that
followed. Few sources specifically focus on the first mass killings in Kovno as an event in itself.
Most see it as a precursor to the more terrible fate that awaited the majority of Lithuanian Jewry.
In addition to focusing on later events, much research on the Holocaust in Germanoccupied Eastern Europe utilizes and focuses on the perpetrators’ perspective. Many scholars
have examined the macro-level explanations for why genocides occur, and the micro-level
motivations and actions of those who participate in them. However, most analysis is of
perpetrators involved in systematic extermination efforts, such as the Final Solution, and
subsequently employ primary sources from the perpetrator’s perspective as well, such as Nazi
documents or post-war court trial testimonies. This material does not reveal much about the
preliminary, more chaotic stages of violence leading to genocide, nor the local, preexisting
sociopolitical conditions that contribute its outbreak. Literature that does explore the Holocaust

23

Arad, “The Murder of the Jews in German-Occupied Lithuania (1941–1944),” 177.
Dov Levin, “Kaunas,” YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, accessed October 27, 2018,
http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Kaunas
24
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from the victim’s perspective often overlooks the early stages of persecution, Jews’ first
traumatic experiences, and their initial responses. Rather, survivor memoirs and scholarly works
tend to focus on later experiences in the Ghettos or in camps. Furthermore, agency, the actions
and choices of Jews in the face of mounting terrors, merits greater study than it has received.
When examined it is mostly explored in the context of Jews’ participation in resistance
movements or partisan units, or experiences of hiding or “passing.” Expanding the use of such an
approach provides a more comprehensive, humanized illustration of the targets of violence.
Studying suffering endured by Jews during the Holocaust is difficult for scholars in many
respects, emotionally and methodologically. Holocaust historian Amos Goldberg notes that
“historians have found it difficult to contend with the full extent of the helplessness that the Jews
experienced.”25 This challenge is precisely why the victim perspective is essential to constructing
a fuller understanding of Holocaust history. The historian Saul Friedländer is notable for
integrating the perspective in his eminent two-volume work, Nazi Germany and the Jews.
According to Friedländer, victim accounts are important because they “reveal what was known
and what could have been known; theirs were the only voices that conveyed both the clarity of
insight and the total blindness of human beings confronted with an entirely new and utterly
horrifying reality.”26 Friedländer emphasizes the importance of acknowledging the individual
actions of Jews who were suffering persecution, for “any steps taken by Jews in order to hamper
the Nazi effort to eradicate every single one of them represented a direct countermove.”
Examining the macro-level processes of the Final Solution does not reveal much of the Jewish
experience, the consequences of Nazi policies on its victims. Rather, it was at the “microlevel

25

Amos Goldberg, Trauma in First Person: Diary Writing During the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2017), ix.
26
Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: Volume 1: The Years of Persecution 1933-1939 (New York:
Harper Collins, 1997), 2.
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that the most basic and ongoing Jewish interaction with the forces acting in the implementation
of the ‘Final Solution’ took place; it is at this microlevel that it mostly needs to be studied.”27 In
his own undertaking he writes that he seeks to “offer a thorough historical examination of the
Jews of Europe, without eliminating or domesticating [their] initial sense of disbelief.”28
Although Jews in Kovno, Lithuania might have been helpless to halt the German invasion, and
their initial exposure to the violence inflicted upon them by local Lithuanians would surely be
met with disbelief, they were not unresponsive or passive when confronted with such a “new and
utterly horrifying reality.”
Amidst the chaos that ensued in Kovno in the days after June 22, 1941, Jews had to rely
on previous knowledge and experiences in their evaluation of unfolding events and to guide their
actions and decisions. I propose that Jews’ interwar relationships and experiences with nonJewish Lithuanians affected how they initially perceived and reacted to the violence. Because
most Jews viewed their lives in Kovno positively, the level of unprecedented violence inflicted
upon their community by local Lithuanians was completely unexpected, although many postwar
testimonies attempt to explain it in hindsight. To borrow Saul Friedländer’s language, it is
important first of all to ask “what was known and what could have been known” about the
potential threats Kovno’s Jewish community would face following a German invasion. Did Jews
feel secure in independent Lithuania during the interwar years? What information or perceptions
did they have about Nazi Germany? Then we can interpret how they acted when “confronted
with an entirely new and utterly horrifying reality.” How did Jews in Kovno react to the initial
violence they experienced or witnessed, and why did they respond in such ways? How did Jews’

27

Saul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper
Collins, 2007), xxiv.
28
Friedländer, The Years of Extermination, xxvi.
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prewar relationships with non-Jews and personal experiences of antisemitism shape their
perceptions of Lithuanians’ participation in the pogroms?

Methodology and Sources
I focus on the short, roughly two-week period following the German invasion of the
Soviet Union, from June 22–July 6, 1941.This timeframe was derived primarily from the
framework established by historian Yitzhak Arad, who constructed a comprehensive, detailed
chronological account of the Nazis’ near-total extermination of Jews in Lithuania. He establishes
three periods of persecution between the German invasion in June 1941 and the arrival of the
Soviet forces in July 1944. The majority of the mass killings occurred during the first period,
June 22 – December 1941, during which about eighty percent of Lithuanian Jews and half of
Kovno’s Jews were murdered.29 Arad further divides this period into two stages, focusing on the
authority in control and the conditions under which the killings were carried out. The first stage,
June 23–July 5, was “characterized by a wave of pogroms and murder initiated and carried out
by Lithuanians;” in the second stage, July 5 – end of December 1941, the Einsatzgruppen units
“took control and led extermination actions, which included the widescale participation of
Lithuanian police units and the full cooperation of local Lithuanian municipal authorities.”30
Lithuanian historian Arūnas Bubnys also breaks down the Holocaust in Lithuania into stages. He
divides the period of the end of June – November 1941 somewhat differently and less
specifically than Arad, into “End-June1941 – mid July 1941” and “End-July – November 1941.”
Like Arad, however, Bubnys identifies July as the month in which the Germans consolidated

29

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Kovno,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, accessed on February 4, 2020,
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/kovno
30
Arad, “The Murder of the Jews in German-Occupied Lithuania (1941–1944),” 177.
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their occupation of Lithuania, which was when the nature of the Jews’ persecution changed
“from separate pogroms to the mass murder of Jews.”31
The closing date cited by Arad for this initial period – July 5 – bears closer examination
According an extensive analysis of summer and fall of 1941 by historians Christoph Dieckmann
and Saulius Sužiedėlis, the final killings at the Seventh Fort occurred in the evening on Sunday,
July 6. No more mass killings occurred in Kovno until after the Ghetto was established. They
note that some members of the Wehrmacht complained that the Lithuanian units carrying out the
July 6 killings “had overdone it.” Subsequently the Nazi official in charge “assumed
responsibility for the ‘orderly’ performance of the murders;” from then on, therefore, Lithuanians
no longer had license to act independently.32 Given the evidence provided by Dieckmann and
Sužiedėlis I extend the period under examination to July 6, 1941.
The murders and violence that occurred between June 22 and July 6 broadly fits the
definition of a pogrom. Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis define pogrom as a “collective violent attack
directed against the Jews simply because they are Jews, that is, antisemitic violence inflicted on
the people themselves, their lives and property, including acts of public humiliation.”33 In
addition to being a “collective” act, scholars Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg note that
pogroms also involve “participation by civilian groups.”34 These are all recognizable elements of
the violence that occurred in Kovno. Taking into account the week-long killings at the Seventh
Fort, which involved more organization than the killings which occurred on the streets of Kovno,
Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis further state how in Kovno “the boundaries separating pogroms and
31

Arūnas Bubnys, “The Holocaust in Lithuania: An Outline of the Major Stages and Their Results” in The Vanished
World of Lithuanian Jews, eds. Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Stefan Schreiner, and Darius Staliūnas (Amsterdam: Rodopi,
2004), 209.
32
Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews, 139.
33
Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews,101.
34
Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg. “Deadly Communities: Local Political Milieus and The Persecution of
Jews In Occupied Poland,” Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 3 (2011): 261.
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mass shootings become somewhat less distinct.”35 Thus, violence in the initial period can be
generally categorized as “pogroms,” while the murders at the Seventh Fort can also be
considered as mass killings facilitated in the context of the pogroms, as Jews were seized from
the streets and their homes and brought to be killed at the fort.
I ground my research in the current literature on German and Lithuanian perpetrator
actions and motivations in the region, since these form the shifting context of victims’
experiences, perceptions, and responses. Using scholarly literature from a variety of disciplines I
evaluate scholarly works on national identity, interethnic relations, and interethnic conflict at the
macro and micro levels of analysis. In examining the specific historical context of Kovno, I also
draw upon literature on Lithuanian regional history that focuses on Jewish history, the
independent interwar years and first Soviet occupation, and the German occupation and
Holocaust.
My analysis terminates at the turning point at which the Germans asserted control over
the murders and subsequently organized and directed future Lithuanian participation in mass
killings. However, in order to connect Jews’ prewar experiences with their reactions to events
after June 22, 1941, I begin my analysis before the start of the war, in the interwar period. While
much of the scholarly literature offers descriptions and explanations of perpetrator actions and
motivations, only victim accounts can reveal how Jews attempted to understand and responded to
those actions. Therefore, I examine contemporaneously written primary sources translated into
English and English-language oral survivor testimonies from the USC Shoah Foundation
Institute Visual History Archive. In analyzing victim accounts, I will be employing a “life course

35

Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews,102.
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perspective,” a sociological concept.36 The life course perspective holds that “human lives are
shaped by a person’s unique location in historical time and place and that early life experiences
have a significant impact on later life outcomes,” such Holocaust survivors’ prewar
experiences.37 I evaluate survivors’ life experiences leading up to the beginning of the war and
through the initial stage of violence. This approach contextualizes individual experiences and
perceptions in that short, two-week period within previous, preexisting sociopolitical conditions
and individuals’ prior knowledge and experiences.
Two examples of eyewitness accounts were written by Jews in the Kovno Ghetto and
buried within the Ghetto before its liquidation, Avraham Tory’s Kovno Ghetto Diary and The
Clandestine History of the Kovno Jewish Ghetto Police. Both sources contain detailed accounts
of the events examined in this thesis. Avraham Tory later became the secretary of the Kovno
Ghetto’s Council of Elders. Tory, however, began writing his diary before entering the Ghetto;
his first entry was written at midnight on June 22, 1941, with some details added a few days
later. In his diary, he included both his personal account of events and official documents from
Jewish leaders and the German and Lithuanian authorities. While some entries were written on
the same day that events occurred, Tory “edited” many other entries to include information that
he learned later.38 The section covering events between June 23 and July 7, 1941, was recorded a
few years later, but the July 7 entry was mostly written that same day. The second source, The
Clandestine History of the Kovno Jewish Ghetto Police, was written in the Ghetto by one
primary author and several contributing authors during 1942 and 1943. It describes events from
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the German invasion on June 22, 1941 through most of 1942. Its second chapter, “The Prehistory
of the Kovno Ghetto” covers the events of June and July 1941 in detail.
It is important to note that these written sources are “official,” rather than “personal,”
accounts.39 They provide an overview of the collective experiences of Kovno’s Jews. Both
sources were written by persons in positions of authority and thus document context and details
that were unlikely to be included in individual testimonies. The authors likely, as Mark Roseman
describes, “saw their task as recording faithfully what was happening.”40 Jan Gross notes that
Jewish archivists during the Holocaust, such as those in the Kovno Ghetto, undertook such tasks
“deliberately.” They did so in light of the difficulty that “the reality surrounding them was such
an exaggeration of everything people were accustomed to in the course of everyday life,” and, as
such, “their concern could only be whether posterity would be capable of believing what had
really happened.”41
In conjunction with the aforementioned written sources, I explore testimonies of people
who were living in Kovno at the time of the German invasion. Survivor testimonies provide
more personal accounts of the experience of persecution as well as provide details about Jewish
life in the interwar period. I examined a diverse range of individual accounts from different
socioeconomic backgrounds, with various levels of religious observance and education. Most
testimonies are from survivors who were adolescents or young adults in 1941. Each survivor
testimony offers a unique perspective and individual experiences that might not be included in
the collective narrative. Idiosyncrasies described in some of the testimonies attest to the
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unpredictable nature of persecution, which in turn emphasizes the significance of the
development of Jews’ sense of agency during the Holocaust and their struggle to ascertain what
could be done to increase their chances of survival.
When gathering testimonies for analysis, I utilized specific index search terms in order to
locate testimonies that included detailed accounts of their lives during the interwar period and the
experience of the pogroms, as these are aspects not discussed at length in some survivor
testimonies.42 It is significant to note, as the oral history scholar Alessando Portelli describes it,
that oral testimonies are “the achievement of a shared labor” between the interviewer and
interviewee. 43 Some survivors recount experiences organically, without prompting, while others
do not. It appears that pre-1941 details such as childhood experiences of antisemitism seem to
need more prompting than retelling of events following the German invasion. 44 Therefore, I
often utilize survivor responses to specific questions asked by the interviewer. Sometimes the
interviewers’ questions or the survivors’ answers contain factual errors. Dates or locations of
events are misidentified, or events are remembered out of order. However, such mistakes do not
discredit testimonies as a historical source.45 Although individual testimonies may contain
different details and contradictions, collectively they “reveal a firm core of shared memory.”46
On the individual level, testimonies convey “not just what people did but what they wanted to
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do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.”47 I am, above all,
interested in their interpretations of and reactions to events as they were occurring, given their
knowledge and perceptions at the time of events. However, as testimonies were recorded years
later, mostly in the 1990s, survivor testimonies also include ex post facto reflections and
information.48 Due to the passage of time, many survivor accounts combine how they felt then
with later reflections and knowledge learned about the events they experienced.
What happened in Kovno is paradoxically incomprehensible but also explainable with the
help of historical hindsight and analysis. The victim perspective shows that Jews actively
interpreted their experiences and asserted their sense of agency whenever and however possible
in order to best protect themselves. My examination of the experiences and actions of the Kovno
Jews will reject any misperception that Jews went like “sheep to the slaughter” during the
Holocaust. Finally, the case of the Kovno pogroms demonstrates the consequences of
exacerbated nationalism and the danger of the latent, persistent “othering” of minority groups, as
such differences can be used to unite “us” against “them” during times of sociopolitical
instability and direct the onset of unexpected violence by one group against another.
Using contemporary written accounts and postwar oral histories, this thesis evaluates the
stark contrast between Jews’ recollections of life in Kovno before June 22, 1941, and their
experiences of and reactions to the pogroms. Because most Jews remembered their prewar
interethnic relations in Kovno positively, the unprecedented violence inflicted upon their
community by local Lithuanians appeared unexpectedly and compounded Jews’ sense of terror
amidst the first days of the German invasion. Chapter 1 presents a conceptual and contextual
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framework for understanding what Jews experienced in June 1941. Chapter 2 examines “what
was known and what could have been known” about being Jewish in interwar Kovno and the
potential threats Jews faced. Chapter 3 demonstrates how Jews exercised agency during the
unprecedented pogroms, making actions and decisions with both “clarity of insight” and “total
blindness.” Chapter 4 reveals the intimate nature of the violence Jews experienced, which
constituted an “entirely new and utterly horrifying reality” as the direction from which the
trouble came was paradoxically unexpected yet familiar.

19

1 Theoretical and Historical
Framework to the Pogroms in Kovno
Historical hindsight allows us to recognize what the Jews in Kovno could not perceive in
those initial, chaotic days after the German invasion in June 1941. While eyewitness accounts
convey the victims’ experience of persecution, we must turn to the scholarly literature for a
fuller, fundamental understanding of the pogroms facing Kovno’s Jews. This task necessitates
taking a broad examination of works across different scholarly disciplines. Different perspectives
will ensure sufficient consideration of the various components comprising violent conflicts, such
as individual actors, their motivations, and their surrounding sociopolitical conditions.
Contemporary scholarship on ethnic identity and intercommunal violence has established
connections between pre-existing sociopolitical conditions and the outbreak of interethnic
conflict. Such literature further notes that the initial onset of collective violence is often the result
of some process of the legitimization of violence and reduction of normal societal restraints on
intergroup interactions. Scholarship on the agency of Holocaust victims also emphasizes the
influence of Jews’ prewar experiences on what happened to them after the war began, such as
individuals’ actions and decisions amidst ongoing persecution. Apart from such comparatively
few works on agency and survival, most research on interethnic violence focuses on perpetrator
motivations.
The content henceforth reviewed is intended to provide a theoretical framework for my
subsequent analysis of victims’ experiences. I first review the sparse literature analyzing agency
and survival of Jews during the Holocaust. Next, I look at various scholarly works from a variety
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of disciplines on the societal conditions that make interethnic violence more likely. I also review
the historical explanations offered on the specific issue of what motivated Lithuanians to
participate in killing Jews during the Holocaust, and why violence erupted in Kovno in
particular. Finally, I explore the debate concerning the German role in the pogroms and mass
killings in Kovno.

Agency and Survival
Victim agency has, until relatively recently, been overlooked in scholarly literature on the
Holocaust. When it is discussed, most works pass over the early experiences of persecution in
the initial period under German rule and focus instead on the role of agency in the development
of survival strategies later in Ghettos and camps. Scholars that do acknowledge and discuss
agency often connect it to Jews’ prewar experiences and knowledge in order to explain their
range of available actions. The concept of agency inherently rejects arguments of Jewish
“passivity” and reevaluates attributions of survival to “luck.” Although agency was restricted
under conditions of oppression and persecution, it was not negated. Jews did what they could,
employing their knowledge and acting within available options. Finally, agency also involves a
sense of adaptability, necessitated by the unpredictable, shifting nature of persecution.
In Surviving the Holocaust, sociologist Ronald Berger analyzes the agency exhibited by
his father and uncle during the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Poland. His father, Michael, endured
several concentration camps, while his uncle, Sol, spent the war “passing” as a Catholic. The
book’s stated focus is the question of survival, which Berger aims to understand in light of
survivors’ previous life experiences. This approach, known as a “life course perspective,”
conceptualizes human action as the combination of agency, “a person’s capacity for selfdirection, an ability to make decisions and exercise a degree of control over their life,” and social
21

structure, which “established external parameters of human action, which enhance and/or limit
opportunities and life outcomes.”49 Social structure consists of cultural schemas, “general
frameworks of action,” and social resources, “the organizational and institutional mechanisms by
which individuals acquire, maintain, or generate power in social relationships.”50 Social
structures can both enable and constrain agency. Berger’s argues that, during the Holocaust,
“some Jews’ agentive capacity under these structural conditions of extremity was enhanced by
their prewar exposure to cultural schemas and social resources that they were able to transpose to
the war-occupation context.”51
Berger attributes his father’s and uncle’s survival to “their prewar exposure to cultural
schemas and social resources that they were able to transpose to the wartime context.” In their
particular case, he emphasizes their ability to speak Polish, tailoring skills, and family upbringing
which encouraged them to take risks, and provides examples of situations in which they were
able to utilize their skill sets in ways that maximized their chances of survival.52 Although the
brothers have radically different survival stories, Berger demonstrates that “both were able to
realistically appraise their situation and take strategic courses of action through calculated risktaking and disobedience.”53 According to Berger’s analysis, previous knowledge and experiences
influenced and empowered strategic decisions. Often the outcome of those choices was
uncertain, nevertheless, decisions had to be made and actions taken.
Given such uncertainty, the “successful” outcome of such choices – survival – is often
attributed solely to “luck,” which mitigates the survivor’s sense of agency. The central role of
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luck in survivors’ stories is explored further by scholar Carolyn Ellis in her review of the
literature on Holocaust survival, including Berger’s book. In her work, she associates “luck” with
chance and “randomness of selection.”54 In her article, Ellis does not reject the role of luck, but
questions its use as a “totalizing explanation for survival.”55 She uses a conversation with a
survivor, Jerry Rawicki, to demonstrate that “luck and agency can go hand in hand,” adding that
agency serves “to maximize though not ensure survival.” Jews made choices without knowing if
they were the “right” ones, nonetheless hoping they were. Ellis discovers that Rawicki
simultaneously and paradoxically “described how he coordinated his actions to survive at the
same time he resisted claiming agency.”56 She finds that Jerry’s attribution of his survival to
luck, rather than his own actions, is reflected in scholarly analysis of survivor testimonies, as
looking for explanations other than luck is uncomfortable in that it might suggest that those who
did not survive could have done something different to change their fate. Thus, although other
academic explanations of survival speculate on the impact of psychological, cultural, and social
and conditions,57 overall, “exploring the ‘how’ of survival in the Holocaust is a quest that in
general has not received much attention.”58 Perhaps one reason for the lack of scholarly literature
on agency is that the victims themselves are reticent to cite the importance of their own actions.59
It is clear that during the Holocaust, luck, chance encounters, and coincidences surely enabled
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some to survive, while others’ unlucky encounters led to their deaths. We will see this
exemplified in survivor accounts of the Kovno pogroms. While luck clearly had an impact on
survival, it is also clear that Jews tried to make their own luck through exercising agency. As
Ellis reminds, “Jews weren’t passive; they resisted all the time even within a situation in which
they often felt powerless.”60
In Ordinary Jews: Choice and Survival during the Holocaust, political scientist Evgeny
Finkel seeks to emphasize such acts of resistance, as exemplified in the various survival
strategies Jews employed during the Holocaust. Jews experiencing persecution were not deprived
of agency, rather, according to Finkel they were “ordinary people who are forced to act in the
face of extraordinary dangers.” 61 In the book, he compares and contrasts Jewish behavior in
three different Jewish ghettos: Minsk, Kraków, and Białystok. Minsk had been under Soviet rule
since 1918 and was occupied by the Germans in June 1941. Krakow, located in western Poland,
was occupied by the Germans in 1939. Białystok, in eastern Poland, was occupied by the Soviets
in September 1939 and then by the Germans in June 1941. Of the three cities, Jews’ experiences
in Białystok would be most similar to that of Jews in Kovno in regard to the successive
occupations by the Soviets then the Germans. Finkel assesses more than 500 survivor testimonies
as well as memoirs and primary source documents produced by Jews in the cities under study.
He purposefully avoids using perpetrator-produced materials for his analysis since his goal is to
“understand internal Jewish perspectives and decisions.”62 He outlines several strategies that
Jewish victims had to choose from (cooperation and collaboration; coping and compliance;
evasion; and resistance) and seeks to determine why an individual would choose one particular
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strategy over another at a certain point in time and why different strategies were more commonly
employed in different ghettos. A majority of Jews, according to Finkel, chose “coping,” which is
not synonymous with passivity, but rather involves “nonviolent, ‘everyday’ or ‘hidden’ forms of
resistance.”63 Finkel argues that a city’s prewar political regime shaped Jews’ choice of survival
strategy; he finds that Jews selected survival strategies based on their prewar level of integration
into non-Jewish society.64
When looking at other explanations for why Jews adopted the strategies they did, Finkel
explores what Jews in their respective cities might have known about Germans prior to their
invasion. Echoing Saul Friedländer, Finkel emphasizes that, across the cities, “the existing
political regime prior to the Nazi occupation shaped what people in these communities knew and
could know about German policies [emphasis added].”65 Furthermore, Finkel cites that “decision
making under conditions of uncertainty is subject to various ‘heuristics,’” the most common of
which is “the tendency to believe that the past is a useful predictor of the future.”66 As we will
see also happen in Kovno, Finkel highlights that, in Minsk, a lack of information about the
Nazis’ anti-Jewish policies, combined with positive memories of the German occupation during
the First World War, led many Jews to decide to stay in the city following the 1941 invasion.67
Accordingly, Finkel determines that previous knowledge alone is not a sufficient explanation for
behavioral variation. Rather than prior knowledge, knowledge acquired amidst persecution was
important for adapting new survival strategies, when old ones appeared to be unsuccessful.68
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However, in the initial stage of persecution, in one as chaotic as Kovno in late June 1941,
there was a steep learning curve for Jews. In Memory Perceived, an analytical study of memory
using over 100 survivor testimonies from the Fortunoff Video Archive at Yale University,
psychologist Robert Kraft outlines stages of adapting to and experiencing atrocity. Kraft focuses
on emotional responses and perceptions instead of physical actions and survival strategies in an
effort to ascertain how memories of periods of prolonged trauma are encoded and recalled.
Specifically, he examines recalled experiences of survival in concentration camps. Since there
are no similar studies of the initial phases of violence as experienced in Kovno, his description of
the first and second stages of adapting to trauma might be extended to apply to other traumatic
experiences and radically new realities. He writes:
In the first stage, the initial exposure to unprecedented cruelty leaves people bereft of
understanding, unable to apply prior learning and unable to comprehend. Reflective
thought disappears; emotion and response disconnect. Contact between ongoing events
and existing knowledge breaks apart, resulting in unguided perception of the events.
Those who are victimized come to know the specific horrors through isolated glimpses,
with fragmented perceptions of an unbelievable reality.69
While Kraft describes the experience of Jews first arriving at concentration camps, this vivid
description seems to capture what my future analysis of the Kovno pogroms will show—how
utterly disorienting it must have been for Jews in the days following June 22, 1941. Although
perhaps unintentional, it appears as if Kraft’s analysis strips Jews of any sense of agency, instead
characterizing their reactions as somewhat irrational. Although the chaotic situation of the
pogroms would have severely restricted avenues of action, it also made the Jews’ assertion of
agency even more critical and remarkable, given the accompanying incomprehension and lack of
knowledge available.
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During the second stage, Kraft describes a resumption of agency, of rational thinking and
decision-making. After the initial shock, “people may use prior knowledge in an effort to
assimilate the horrible events…new schemas of atrocity are pieced together, and there are
attempts to organize the unrecognizable.”70 As we will see, this process aligns with the Kovno
Jews’ experience in July 1941. After the chaotic pogroms and unprecedented mass killings at the
forts, the fact that the local Lithuanians had attacked them was now “recognizable.” This new
understanding would have impacted how Jews reacted to and understood the order to establish a
Ghetto in the city. Kraft’s conception of these initial stages of apprehending atrocity are useful to
understand the emotional state of Jews. Emotional response does not negate agentive decisionmaking but does help frame it.

Interethnic Violence
In contrast to victim agency, perpetrator agency has received extensive scholarly study,
often connecting ethnic violence and genocide with a community’s preexisting interethnic
relations and societal conditions. Such works focus on the construction and crystallization of
identities and the role of sociopolitical crises fomenting interethnic tensions. The literature
demonstrates that ethnic violence does not erupt spontaneously, that it is the result of a
culmination of pressures. Some form of catalyst helps to facilitate an environment in which
normal constraints on collective violence disappear, legitimizing the transformation of latent
emotions into violent actions. Throughout these processes we see that violence is often motivated
by perceptions, not reality.
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Identifying the “Other”
As a newly independent state, defining a Lithuanian national identity was an important
step in nation-building, and thus “Lithuanians developed an abiding fixation with the ‘who
belongs’ question and a rigid view of the answer.”71 Jews, decidedly, did not belong. In the
article “National Identity and the ‘Other’,” Anna Triandafyllidou describes this “double-edged
character of national identity,” which establishes an ingroup and an outgroup, even within the
borders of the same nation.72 She develops the term “internal significant others” to describe
minority groups which are deemed as “threatening” and who are “perceived” to “erode the unity
and/or authenticity of the nation from ‘within.’”73 This outgroup, which can exist
unproblematically within society in times of peace and stability, can easily become a scapegoat
“in periods of social, political or economic crisis during which the identity of the nation is put in
question.” 74
Henri Zukier addresses this perception of outsiders as threatening in his conception of
“the imaginary Jew.” He asserts that, throughout modern history, “the Jew remains forever in the
mind of the West the most readily available and imaginable target for exclusion, the most
essential outsider of society,” which he says is rooted in Catholic Church doctrine.75 Echoing
Triandafyllidou’s concept of “internal significant others,” Zukier writes that Jews’ “archetypical
crime is penetration and subversion of the national body.”76 Again, the “outsider’s” identity
becomes most relevant in times of crises, when “people anxiously attempt to make sense of
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unsettling circumstances…they search for ready-made answers” 77 Accordingly, although
Lithuanian citizens, Jews were considered outsiders. Although an enduring condition, it became
lethally dangerous in times of crises.

Interethnic Relations and Violence
People of different ethnic identities often live together peacefully in many situations.
Thus, scholars attempt to explain what motivates the people of one group to attack another in
other circumstances. Several scholarly articles explore the impact of group identity on interethnic
violence, and in particular address the connection between ethnic violence during the Holocaust
and the preceding level of integration of different ethnic groups. Like Evgeny Finkel, scholars
who look at perpetrator actions also evaluate and emphasize the impact of political regimes and
social integration.
Lisa Haagensen and Marnix Croes focus on perpetrators’ dehumanization of victims
during genocide, after a conflict has already begun.78 In addition to examining the Rwandan
Genocide, they treat the Holocaust in Western Europe and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe as
separate cases. Their analysis assumes that dehumanization facilitates genocidal violence
because it reduces psychological and moral restraints on killing other humans. Accordingly, the
authors hypothesize that “the smaller the social distance between the perpetrator group and the
victim group prior to genocide the more severe the dehumanization behaviors of the perpetrators
during genocide.” 79 In order to test their hypothesis, they modified an existing “social distance
scale” and created a ranked list of dehumanizing behaviors, derived from in-depth analysis of
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accounts from each of the three case studies.80 Their study results show that during the genocide
in Rwanda in 1994, severe dehumanization occurred due to the great degree of social integration
of Hutus and Tutsis. In comparison, they found that the German Einsatzgruppen and SD units
engaged in “less severe dehumanization behavior” when killings Jews in Eastern Europe. As the
victim and perpetrator groups were strangers, having had no social interaction prior to the
outbreak of violence, severe dehumanization was not needed to break social bonds like in
Rwanda.81 Notably, Haagensen and Croes support their argument by specifically mentioning
instances of Lithuanian participation in local police units accompanying the Einsatzgruppen in
Eastern Europe. They observe that “dehumanization was particularly severe” in the violence
perpetrated by local Lithuanians, and connect that assessment to the claim that “the Lithuanians
involved in the killings were often former customers, neighbors and classmates.”82 As such, they
separate the Lithuanian violence from the actions of the Germans in Eastern Europe, and instead
claim that it bore similarities with what happened in Rwanda.
In another study, Diana Dumitru and Carter Johnson assess the “quality” of prewar
interethnic relationships and how it might have caused individuals to either help or harm Jews in
Eastern Europe. Their article compares two regions in Eastern Europe, Bessarabia and
Transnistria. Both had “been subjected to heavily antisemitic state policies from at least 1812 to
1918,” but during the interwar period, “Bessarabia continued with its antisemitism” under
Romanian rule, while Transnistria was “under a strongly inclusivist nationality policy” as a result
of its inclusion in the Soviet Union, which promoted internationalist cooperation.83 The authors
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found that during World War II, “the Bessarabian side was more likely to commit violent acts
against its Jewish population than the Transnistrian side, which in turn was more likely to
provide aid to the Jews.” They conclude that non-Jews in Transnistria “internalized” a
commitment to interethnic cooperation during the interwar period, which had been fostered by
the Soviets, “despite a new government [imposed Romanian rule] that rewarded victimization of
the Jews and severely punished any attempts to assist them.”84 Therefore, Dumitru and Johnson
establish that individual motivations and actions are connected to and influenced by state
policies. Accordingly, interethnic animosities are not rigid but flexible, and can be either
inflamed or mitigated by such conditions. In addition, they point out that the case of Bessarabia
bears similarities to that of Lithuania, which was independent for most of the interwar period and
therefore was not subject to the inclusivist Soviet policies, except for the year of Soviet
Occupation from 1940–1941.85
Dumitru and Johnson look at territories under Romanian occupation during World War
II, where violence occurred, but was not prompted by German invasion. The phenomenon of
pogroms immediately following the German invasion of the Soviet Union is specifically studied
by Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg. They looked at the onset of pogroms in various
communities in what had been northeastern Poland during the summer of 1941, aiming to
explain why pogroms broke out in some communities but not others. They find that “the greater
the degree of intercommunal polarization between Jews and the titular majority group, the more
likely a pogrom.” 86 They specifically look at the economic and cultural/political polarization as
identifiable in census and national election results during the interwar period. Their research
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suggests that “localities where the Jews were already perceived as a threatening ‘Other’—places
with large numbers of Jews who opted for ethnic particularism—provided fertile ground for antiJewish violence.”87 Thus the pogroms can be understand as the Poles “reacting to the perceived
unwillingness of Jews to assimilate into Polish political life.” Similar to how Dumitru and
Johnson identify the influence of state policies in promoting or discouraging ethnic integration,
Kopstein and Wittenberg find that “the failure of the Polish state to politically integrate its
Jewish citizens” contributed to the polarization. 88 In contrast to the above cited articles, which
focus on the opposing actions of perpetrator violence or the decision to help Jews, Kopstein and
Wittenberg ascertain a third pattern of behavior: indifference. They assert that polarization not
only contributed to participation in pogroms but made Poles “more tolerant of others committing
violence, and less likely to come to the aid of the victims.”89 As we will see, such attitudes were
present among many Lithuanians in Kovno, who demonstrated inaction and indifference rather
than actively engaging in hostilities.
In his analysis of genocidal violence, Aristotle Kallis attributes perpetrators’ participation
to the culmination of two forms of “license.” First, the existence of “a long-term license to hate a
particular out-group and desire its elimination,” and then a “a short-term license to kill that
authorizes the group to adopt violent practices of elimination against this very particular ‘other’
by suspending individual accountability and by overriding inhibiting factors.”90 Kallis
categorizes the resulting cumulative violence as a “carnival,” in that normally prohibited
behavior is permitted and legitimized. He notes that “the legitimization of the act itself rests on
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and feeds into the prior delegitimization of the victims” 91 These concepts parallel Alexander
Hinton’s notion of the processes of “genocidal priming and activation,” which also connects
societal conditions before genocide occurs with what happens as genocide unfolds. Correlating
with long-term license, Hinton identifies “socioeconomic or political upheaval” and the “process
of envisioning difference” as the two key “primes” that, when “triggered,” can spark the onset of
violence by one group against another. The first results in the destabilization of society, which
can “intensify group divisions” and create a sense of threat and danger.”92 The latter, as a
consequence of the former, results in the scapegoating of individuals based on the notion that
“the annihilation of a threatening or impure group will help create the preconditions for a better
life.”93 The onset of violence “almost always involves some sort of ‘genocidal activation’— a
series of direct and indirect, more or less organized pushes from above,” which grants what
Kallis refers to as short-term license.94
In such situations, Roger Petersen argues that emotions of would-be perpetrators drive
their violent behavior and determine who will be targeted. In his evaluation of instances of ethnic
violence in Eastern Europe throughout the twentieth century, Petersen describes emotion as a
“switch” prompting individuals to meet some need or desire. He connects emotion to the
“essentialization of identities that underlies ethnic conflict,” as “identities can crystallize when
one is in the grasp of a powerful emotion.”95 His work highlights that that ethnic violence often
occurs when state powers collapse. Thus, he maintains “emotion helps explain the spontaneous
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yet directed and purposeful nature” of leaderless collective violence; the driving emotion– Fear,
Hatred, Resentment, or Rage—determines the target of the violence.96
In contrast to other scholarly explanations of interethnic violence, political scientist John
Mueller argues that the entire concept of “ethnic warfare” is “severely misguided.”97 After
assessing violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, he determines that “the
mechanism of violence…is remarkably banal.” He determines that most perpetrators were
opportunistic, non-ideological, and sometimes intoxicated, thus their actions did not reflect
“deep, historic passions and hatreds.”98 Mueller does, however, emphasize that such violence
“could happen almost anywhere under the appropriate conditions,” when local conditions enable
and legitimize violence. Like Kopstein and Wittenberg, the author also addresses others’ lack of
action, observing that in Rwanda only a minority of a population participated in the violence,
while the rest, “stood by in considerable confusion, and, often, indifference.”99 This pattern of
local participation in interethnic violence is reminiscent of what happened in Kovno.
Although scholars show that perpetrators’ actions and motivations are varied, the
consequences for their victims are the same. It is victims’ actions and motivations, in response to
perpetrator’s actions, which remains insufficiently examined in scholarly literature.

Lithuanian Participation in Killing Jews
The essentialization of national identity and breakdown of sociopolitical integration helps
explain and describe the deterioration of interethnic relations between Jews and non-Jews in
Lithuania during the interwar period, which accelerated during the Soviet Occupation. In Kovno,
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the initial murders of Jews at the hands of the Lithuanians were facilitated by a lack of
constraints following the German invasion. Preexisting societal conditions and interethnic
relationships either directed Lithuanians to unleash their anger on the Jews or facilitated their
passivity towards the Jews’ persecution.

Lithuanian Motivations
Roger Petersen describes the violence which erupted in Lithuania in June 1941 as a
reaction to the prior year’s Soviet Occupation. In the chaos that resulted from the German
invasion and subsequent Soviet retreat, “a rapid lifting of constraints produced masses of
leaderless individuals.” He also reflects that the situation “came as close to anarchy as one can
expect to see,” explaining that “widespread emotional antipathies can substitute for leadership in
these situations.”100 He seeks to address five “puzzles” centered on event timelines, targeted
groups, and the nature of violence in the aftermath of the invasion.101 Of his four emotional
motivations assessed in his research, he finds that Resentment as well as Rage best fit the case of
the Lithuanian pogroms. The Soviet Occupation had disrupted the Lithuanian ethnic hierarchy
existing political order, which “produced beliefs of injustice and emotions of Resentment.”
Outraged Lithuanians sought to put others “back in their place.” The collapse of Soviet rule
opened opportunities for violence “that quickly resubordinated minority groups, especially
Jews.”102 Petersen connects Resentment with the horrifying acts of public humiliation that
occurred during the Kovno pogroms, in particular the targeting of Rabbis, who were easily
identifiable as Jews because of their manner of dress.
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Resentment posits that Lithuanians attacked Jews specifically, while the emotional
mechanism of Rage explains that Jews were attacked not as Jews but as “substitute targets.”
Encouraged by the myth of Judeo-Bolshevism and misperceptions of Jews’ roles in the Soviet
administration, and in light of the Soviets’ rapid retreat and resulting chaotic environment,
Petersen notes how “Jews were an available, and vulnerable, substitute target.”103 Significantly,
he rejects the argument that Lithuanians attacked Jews due to ethnic hatred, noting that there was
no previous pattern of antisemitic-motivated violence in modern Lithuania. Indeed, for this same
reason, “the brutal and humiliating actions of Lithuanians…came as a shock to most of the
Jewish victims.”104
While Petersen ties Lithuanian violence against Jews to the directly preceding Soviet
Occupation, Karen Sutton takes her analysis further back. According to her, we must recognize
the much longer history of “deeply rooted” antisemitism throughout Lithuanian society,
primarily emanating from “the teachings of the Church, modern nationalism, and political and
socioeconomic conditions.”105 She asserts the need to understand that “the Jews constituted an
economically distinct, culturally isolated group within the body politic; Jews were not seen as
‘Lithuanian compatriots.’”106 Not only were Jews were not considered “Lithuanians,” the
difference in religion maintained that Lithuanians saw Jews “as aliens whose culture and way of
life conflicted with their own.”107 In the majority-Catholic country, Sutton emphasizes that
religious antisemitism had just as much of a role to play as economic and political antisemitism,
despite the fact that Lithuanian historians often gloss over moments of religious antisemitic
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violence throughout Lithuanian history.108 Jews’ economic status and roles also earned them
Lithuanian animosity.109
Although emphasizing the existence of multifaceted Lithuanian antisemitism prior to the
Soviet Occupation, Sutton does stress that the occupation drastically worsened the relationship
between Jews and non-Jews. Political antisemitism in particular became extremely potent. Sutton
asserts that the negative association of Jews with Communism helps explain why some
Lithuanians “sided with the Nazis proactively” and most Lithuanians “responded passively”
during the Holocaust in Lithuania.110 Given the foundational existence of antisemitism, after the
German invasion, “Lithuanian leaders could bargain with the lives of Jews to attain their dearest
goal, independence. That they could also solve their Jewish problem was an added bonus.”111

Kovno in June 1941
Christoph Dieckmann and Saulius Sužiedėlis extensively study what happened in the
summer and fall of 1941. They contextualize events by emphasizing the nature of Operation
Barbarossa as a “war of extermination.”112 Thus, their analysis reveals much about the
relationship between the invading, occupying Germans and the collaborating Lithuanians. The
authors use German and Lithuanian documentation and eyewitness accounts to detail the
important events and developments that occurred. They elaborate on many aspects and events
that are only briefly mentioned in other sources. Like Petersen and Sutton, they emphasize how
the period of Soviet rule amplified preexisting interethnic tensions.113Attacks on Jews began
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almost immediately upon the arrival of news of the German invasion. Jews constituted a majority
of civilians killed in the first week. As Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis note, “with the exception of
real and alleged Communists and Soviet collaborators, no other group endured such egregious
public humiliation.”114 While some Jews might have been attacked for being “Communists,”
most were target simply for their identities as Jews.115
Lithuanian antisemitism in Kovno was not only activated by the German invasion, but the
Germans’ arrival in the city further legitimized and encouraged violence against Jews. Scholarly
accounts describe the pogroms as emerging within, and because of, the chaos created in the city
in the wake of the Soviets’ retreat. The city had become the center of the Lithuanian Activist
Front’s Anti-Soviet uprising; however, Petersen concludes that the LAF was not entirely in
control of the violence that erupted throughout the city.116 Sutton identifies various motivations
for the initial attacks, ranging from “sheer opportunism to sincere and deep-rooted lust to avenge
the Crucifixion and retaliate for persecution suffered under the Soviets.117 Similar to Petersen’s
attribution of Lithuanian violence to “Rage,” she says that partisans attacked Jews in light of the
Soviet’s rapid withdrawal from the city. According to Kallis, “a sense of ‘license’ derived from
the breakdown of order and the power vacuum was generated,” and was “seized autonomously
by local forces in the absence or benevolent disinterest” of the arriving Germans.118 He describes
the events as reminiscent of “a carnival,” in that the pogroms “took the form of an extraordinary
suspension of conventional moral norms and a transgression into a different sphere of ritualistic
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carnage where the ‘excess energy’ of resentment could be fully expended in a festival of
rage.”119
According to Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, outside of Kovno, “similar massacres on such
an extreme scale occurred nowhere else in Lithuania.”120 Scholars particularly focus on the fact
that pogroms did not break out in Vilna, a city of similar size, as they did in Kovno. Sutton notes
that “popular fury needs sanction, either explicit or implicit,” and reasons that because the Jewish
population outnumbered the ethnic Lithuanians in Vilna, the latter “probably felt too insecure to
act out its violence with impunity and reacted to the euphoria by demonstrating some initial
restraint.”121 In respect to his argument that the Lithuanians’ were motivated by Resentment,
Petersen says that Poles, rather than Jews, would have been the targeted in Vilna because “Poles
were the greatest impediment to present and future Lithuanian status dominance.” 122 Kovno is
further significant because, according to Arūnas Bubnys, the “move from separate pogroms to
the mass murder of Jews…was done first of all in Kaunas.”123 Thus, Kovno in June and July
1941 was a unique phenomenon both in regards to the scale and intensity of its pogroms and it
being the first Lithuanian city to experience German-organized mass-murder.
Although there is substantial evidence that the majority of killing was done by the local
Lithuanians, there is considerable debate about the extent to which Lithuanians independently
initiated pogroms, whether or not they began to kill large numbers of Jews before the German
army arrived in Kovno, and to what extent the Germans directed the violence after they arrived
in the city. Bubnys categorizes the pogrom in Kovno as “Gestapo-initiated,” and challenges the
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“allegation” that “between 22 June 1941 and 5 July Lithuanians perpetrated anti-Jewish acts and
controlled the situation in Lithuania.” He asserts, rather, that the Lithuanian perpetrators were not
autonomous, they “had to carry out the orders of the German military administration and
operational groups.”124 In their examination of the period, Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis take a
cautious approach to the debate. They note “there is no easy way to determine to what extent
German encouragement inspired local violence towards Jews or to what degree this was the
result of politically and ethnically motivated spontaneous outbreaks. Certainly, both factors
played their part.”125
One potential reason for this debate is that most scholars primarily rely on the same Nazi
sources to provide insight into the Germans’ accounts of the process of persecuting Lithuanian
Jews in summer 1941.126 On June 29, 1941, Reinhard Heydrich issued Einsatzgruppen Order No.
1, instructing the Einsatzgruppen that the Lithuanian pogroms “‘should in no way be hindered.
On the contrary, they must be encouraged…and even intensified.’”127 This written statement
reiterated directions given at a meeting prior to the invasion, on June 17.128 In an October 15,
1941, report summarizing his unit’s operations between June and October, Franz Stahlecker, the
commander of Einsatzgruppe A, writes that he followed Heydrich’s order, and he details the
Germans’ encouragement of and involvement in the Kovno pogroms and the results. According
to Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, “Stahlecker recalled how his EG A had succeeded in this task
‘despite great difficulties, in provoking the local anti-Semitic powers to organize pogroms
against the Jews…. Nevertheless, through the directives given to Klimaitis, the
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Vorauskommando of EG A managed to initiate a pogrom.’”129 The report further states that EG
A was “‘doing its best’ to film and photograph the events in Kaunas” so as to prove that the
locals were carrying out the murders themselves.130 The Jäger reports, written by the commander
of Einsatzkommando 3, Standartenführer Karl Jäger, details the locations of mass killings and the
numbers of Jews killed by the unit through December 1, 1941, including statistics on the initial
murders in Kovno. The first report, published in September, “reported that ‘partisans’ had killed
an estimated 4,000 Jews in pogroms, of whom nearly 800 had perished ‘during the time of
EK1b,’ that is, before EK3 took control in Kaunas.” In his follow-up report in December, Jäger
“noted that the killings of 4 and 6 July were carried out by Lithuanian partisans ‘on my direction
and orders.’”131
Andrew Ezergailis looks at such sources and asserts that “‘Neighbors’ Did Not Kill
Jews!” in Eastern Europe during the Holocaust. His title is a reference to Jan Gross’s Neighbors,
a seminal work examining the phenomena of pogroms following the German invasion of the
Soviet Union. In his book, Gross examines the circumstances surrounding the massacre which
took place in Jedwabne, Poland, when, in the course of one day, “half the population of a small
European town murdered the other half—some 1,600 men, women, and children.”132 In his
essay, Ezergailis pushes back against “the corollary to the ‘neighbors’ thesis,” that “the killing of
Jews in Eastern Europe was Germanless and leaderless.”133 He contends that, due to the nature of
the Nazi system of occupation, the local perpetrators could not have acted autonomously. He
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relies on the October 15 Stahlecker report to substantiate much of his argument. Citing
Stahlecker’s admission that it was difficult to incite pogroms and his description of the
organization of auxiliary police units, Ezergailis says that the report “proves on the one hand that
German-organized native formations participated in the murder of Jews and on the other hand
that it was not a free-for-all but instead a programmed and organized operation.”134 He claims
that Stahlecker’s writings are a reliable source because the “reports were confidential and
intended for his superiors to whom he could boast but not lie.”135 Although he might not have
been lying, it is also understandable that the commander would have wanted to take credit for the
Lithuanians’ actions and assert that the Germans were indeed in control of the situation.
Ezergailis specifically addresses the Kovno pogroms as one “typical” example of the
“neighbors” narrative. In attempting to discount it, he poses questions and assertions that, in turn,
can be discounted and corrected. He incorrectly asserts that “in Eastern Europe, for example,
there is no analogy to the ‘stab in the back’ idea that so deeply agitated the soul of Germany.”136
Indeed, Saulius Sužiedėlis specifically uses the phrase to describe the rise of Lithuanian
antisemitism during the Soviet Occupation, when Jews began to be perceived “as traitors,
‘stabbing in the back’ the state and nation whose land they had enjoyed as guests – or in
antisemitic parlance ‘exploiters’ – for centuries.”137 Ezergailis goes on to state that, “Even if
there was a sufficient explanation for ‘neighbors’ attacking ‘neighbors’ and the motivation for it
made clear and credible, it still would need to have an explanation as to why it should have been
done in the primitive manner in which it is averred to have happened.”138 An answer to this
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question could be found in Haagensen and Croes’s conclusion that more brutal, dehumanizing
violence occurs in violent conflicts where there was previously less social distance between
perpetrators and victims, such as in Kovno where, despite the presence of Lithuanian
antisemitism, Jews and non-Jews often lived in the same neighborhoods and their children
attended the same schools. Furthermore, Petersen’s mechanism of “Resentment” also explains
instances of brutal, humiliating violence.
From his reading of Stahlecker’s report, the author claims that it “does not allow us to say
in Lithuania there is a strong case for ‘neighbors’ killing ‘neighbors’ scenarios.”139 Much of his
argument pertains to the situation which had coalesced by July 1941 and applies less so to the
chaotic, liminal period between June 22 and July 6, 1941. Indeed, even if we accept that the
Germans fully directed the murders, “neighbors” were still killing “neighbors,” the local
Lithuanians were not forced to participate against their will. There is a question of the definition
of “neighbor,” whether we take it to mean individuals residing in the same city or those who live
next to each other. Nonetheless, both broad and narrow definitions describe Lithuanian
participation in the Kovno pogroms. Survivor testimonies sometimes identify Lithuanian
perpetrators by name and often describe their shock at being targeted by people they had known,
worked with, went to school with, and lived next to.

Conclusion
Literature on interethnic violence emphasizes the need to understand a community’s past,
as it is what frames the future actions of perpetrators and victims alike. In doing so we can see
connections between levels of integration, the essentialization of identities and exacerbation of
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differences, and the legitimation of violence. This chapter has placed Kovno in theoretical and
historical context, illuminating the ways in which what happened in Kovno in 1941 follows the
pattern of other instances of ethnic violence and establishing that the city was ripe for such
violence to break out. During the interwar years, ethnic Lithuanians increasingly identified Jews
as the threatening “other.” The intense sociopolitical upheaval of the Soviet Occupation
exacerbated interethnic tensions, as Jews became viewed as responsible for the Lithuanians’
suffering. The German invasion provided the catalyst for the outbreak of pogroms. In the chaotic
environment, Lithuanians, motivated by a variety of reasons from virulent antisemitism to
opportunism, had license to engage in violence. Jews, having been othered and scapegoated for
years, were easily identified and unprotected targets. In the face of such unprecedented danger,
Kovno’s Jews exercised agency accordingly whenever and however possible. But in the chaos,
agency was severely restricted, and luck and chance likely played a large role in their survival
With such contextual and historical hindsight, we can understand the situation in which
local Lithuanians targeted Jews. But in June 1941, the historical context which determined Jews’
reactions was their lives in Kovno before June 22, 1941.
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2 “What Was Known and What Could
Have Been Known”: Jewish Life in
Interwar Kovno
Jews in interwar Kovno knew Lithuanian Gentiles to be antisemitic, but they also knew
them as their neighbors, friends, teachers, and classmates. While the threat of a belligerent Nazi
Germany mounted during the 1930s, culminating in the outbreak of war in September 1939,
Jews in Kovno felt a sense of security in Lithuania. They were fearful of external threats such as
occupying and invading foreign armies, and indeed the Soviet Union occupied the country in
June 1940, but they were not worried about life in Lithuania as Jews. Although Lithuanian
nationalism and antisemitism increased during the interwar years, positive interethnic
relationships still existed. These were destabilized by the year of Soviet Occupation and
demolished after the Nazi invasion. Thus, relative to the “entirely new and utterly horrifying
reality” of life after June 22, 1941, life in interwar Lithuania had indeed been fairly good for
Kovno’s Jews. In order to assess how they confronted their new reality we must first understand
“was known and what could have been known” about life as Jews in Kovno.
Only with hindsight can one survivor describe Jews’ sense of security as “complacency,”
as the most immediate, lethal threat came not from across the border, but from down the street.140
There is a somewhat “nostalgic” character to some survivors’ recollections of life in interwar
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Kovno, Lithuania.141 The Holocaust survivors’ testimonies analyzed in this chapter mostly
describe their childhood and adolescence, as they were born in the early or mid-1920s and thus
grew up in independent Lithuania, under the rule of President Antanas Smetona. This is not to
say, however, that their evaluations of life in Kovno should be attributed to childhood ignorance
of the tense domestic and international political climate developing in 1930s Lithuania and
throughout Europe. In addition to information acquired themselves and gained from older family
members, their testimonies relay their own experiences of growing up Jewish in Kovno. They
were, even as children, aware of their Jewish identity in the city and of events that related to their
Jewishness, and interpreted experiences accordingly.
Despite positive social and professional interactions with non-Jews, Jews were still seen
as a separate ethnic group, and thus Lithuanian nationalism inherently excluded Jews from
gaining full membership in society. This sense of difference, of “otherness,” from the perspective
of some ethnic Lithuanians, could have contributed to their readiness to participate in harming
Jews after June 22, 1941. But did this same sense of separateness exist from the Jews’
perspective? What did it mean to be a Jew growing up in Kovno during the interwar years? How
did Jews interact with Gentiles, and how did they evaluate and experience the persistence of
antisemitism in Lithuanian society? How was the Soviet Occupation perceived to have affected
Jewish life in Kovno? In a wider context, not only did Jews’ relationships with Gentiles in
Lithuania impact their sense of security. What did Jews understand about Nazism and was it
perceived to be a threat to themselves in Kovno? Did Jewish perceptions of the Nazi German
threat change over time?
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Jewish Life in Independent Lithuania
During the establishment and consolidation of an independent Lithuanian state in the
early interwar years, Lithuanian nationalists saw Jews as an important source of support in the
new nation. Initially Jews were perceived as less threatening than the other large minority group
in Lithuania, ethnic Poles.142 Historian Česlovas Laurinavičius thus categorizes the early
relationship between ethnic Lithuanians and Jews as a “political alliance,” but one that did not
further develop into a “civic consolidation” as Jews were not fully welcomed as valued, equal
participants in Lithuanian politics. As another Lithuanian historian succinctly put it, “Jews did
not become Lithuanians” automatically following Lithuanian independence.143 Accordingly,
Laurinavičius describes Lithuanian domestic policy as decidedly “Lithuanian;” that is,
“nationalist and ethnocentric.”144 However, this was not manifest in overtly antisemitic policies
or national movements, as was the case with German nationalism in Nazi Germany. Indeed,
during its years of independence, even during the authoritarian reign of Antanas Smetona, the
Lithuanian political system “provided a basic guarantee for the country’s minorities and, when
necessary, a physical barrier of police force against base nativist instincts.”145 In such an
environment, educated, middle-class Jews, such as those who resided in Kovno, began to adopt
Lithuanian culture as their own during the 1920s. One such indication of this bourgeoning
integration is that the first Lithuanian-language Jewish secondary school was opened in Kovno in
the 1920s.146
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Jewish life in Kovno was not monolithic; in a community of approximately 30,000
people, professional occupations, levels of religious observance, political views, and
socioeconomic status varied widely. Jack Brauns, born in 1924, was the son of a well-respected
doctor who was director of the contagious diseases department in the city’s Jewish hospital, and
his mother was a successful author of English teaching books. Morris Rich, also born in 1924,
was the son of a woodturner, albeit an “educated” woodturner in his own assessment compared
to other tradesmen, yet it was still a “poor trade.”147 Margaret Kagan’s mother, Anna Gure’s
grandfather, and Waldemar Ginsburg’s stepfather all had arrived in Kovno after fleeing Russia
following the Bolshevik Revolution. However, Kagan’s father was liberal and was a member of
an organization which helped provide aid to communists who had been jailed in Lithuania; the
Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) was banned by the Smetona regime, but still operated
underground. Gure’s and Kagan’s families were both well-off and well-connected. Gure’s father
owned a construction company and their family had a nurse, cook, and chauffer, when not many
families, Jewish or non-Jewish, had cars in Kovno at that time. Kagan’s father managed the state
lottery and their family was “comfortably off.”148 Neither girls’ family was observant. Waldemar
Ginsburg’s mother was an accountant, and they lived with his maternal grandparents. His
grandfather was religious and imparted Jewish traditions and observance on his grandson, but
Ginsburg was more secular, as were most of his Jewish friends.
Whether well-off or less privileged, observant or not, many Jews regularly interacted
with and knew non-Jews, albeit to varying degrees. At a basic level, regardless of the personal
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relationships and interactions between Jews and non-Jews, they lived next to each other
throughout Kovno. Morris Rich, who lived in Slobodka, a suburb of Kovno where Jews
traditionally resided, said that there were “a lot of non-Jews” in his town, including next-door
neighbors, with whom Jews were “very friendly.”149 Margaret Kagan lived in an affluent
neighborhood in central Kovno, with fewer Jews than in the “old town”; she specifically
remembers interacting with non-Jewish Lithuanian neighbors who were around her age,
including putting on a play together in her family’s apartment.150 Jack Brauns lived on the main
street in the city, and recalled that most of the people who lived there were Jewish, including the
owner of the house.
Although Jewish children in Kovno may have grown up living next-door to non-Jews,
they attended different types of schools and therefore had varying degrees of interactions with
non-Jewish children. Families could choose to send them to state or private schools with nonJews, or to Jewish schools. Rich attended a Jewish school, the Talmud Torah, in Slobodka.
Brauns, Gure, Kagan, and Ginsburg all initially attended German-language private schools, yet
Jewish children left those schools after Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933 (voluntarily,
according to some Holocaust survivors’ recollections). Jack Brauns and Anna Gure then went to
Jewish gymnasiums (high schools), but Brauns was taught in Hebrew and Gure was taught in
Lithuanian. Gure still socialized with non-Jews outside of school while Brauns said that he
almost exclusively had Jewish friends. Margaret Kagan and Waldemar Ginsburg went to state
Lithuanian schools. Ginsburg said he “didn’t feel any antisemitism at school, our school was a
very tolerant school, which could have been an exception I don’t know, but there was no
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discrimination and I had a lot of Lithuanian friends, as well as Jewish friends.”151 Kagan recalled
there being very few Jewish classmates at her school and described one instance in which she
was singled out for being Jewish by a teacher. She had gotten a good grade in a class, and the
teacher said that the Lithuanian girls should be “ashamed.” Kagan herself understood the
statement “as a compliment to me that I, not being a proper Lithuanian, being Jewish, had done
so well and they hadn’t.” While she acknowledged that that instance could be interpreted as
antisemitism, she maintained that she did not see it as such.152
Although there was a sense that Jews were different than Lithuanians, this in itself was
not perceived to be a negative consequence of antisemitism or Lithuanian nationalism. While not
being “a proper Lithuanian” in the eyes of her teacher, Margaret Kagan described her family as
“very much more part of the Lithuanian establishment.”153 Accordingly, her father played poker
with “Lithuanian dignitaries” and tennis with President Smetona’s son.154 For Kagan, it seems as
if her Lithuanian identity was stronger than her Jewish identity. At seven years old, she knew
that she was Jewish, “I knew I was different,” she said, but she was not entirely aware of what
that meant. Once, when attending a friend’s family Easter celebration, the host apologized that
Kagan could not eat the pork that was offered. This confused Kagan because her family did not
observe the Jewish dietary regulations of kashrut, and therefore “wasn’t aware enough that their
food was different than Jewish food.”155
According to Jack Brauns, Jewish identity was perhaps more salient in Kovno than
Kagan’s testimony indicated, and unconnected to the level of religious observance. He affirmed,
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“people were Jewish– even if they were religious or they were not, but they were very
Jewish.”156 Brauns’s family was as equally well-connected as Kagan’s, but he did not say if they
were a part of the “Lithuanian establishment” as she claimed. His father was a prominent
physician who had Lithuanian patients, knew government officials, and had even been called to
consult for the president once when he was sick. However, Brauns said that his family did not
have “a social relationship” with non-Jews. Rather, he described their relationship as “cordial, a
mutual respect for each other, an appreciation for each other.”157 From his evaluation of their
interethnic relationship, and Margaret Kagan’s family’s experiences, it does not appear that
Lithuanians and Jews felt that any perceived differences negated their willingness or ability to
interact with each other, professionally or socially. Kagan’s family more fully integrated
themselves than Brauns’s, but it seems to have been their choices to do so or not, since both
fathers had the opportunity as successful and well-respected professionals in Lithuanian society.
Thus, Judaism may have made them different, but being Jewish did not necessarily make life
more difficult for Jews in general in Kovno or make some Jews uncomfortable interacting with
non-Jewish Lithuanians at work, at school, or in their neighborhoods.

Antisemitism in Kovno
Despite opportunities for increased assimilation, full integration of Jews into Lithuanian
society was stunted by a growing sense of “Lithuanian self-consciousness” during the interwar
years, resulting in a “process of Jewish exclusion,” accelerated and institutionalized after the
1926 ascension of the right-wing Nationalist Party to power.158 According to Lithuanian
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historian Alfonsas Eidintas, the coup d’état was a reaction by Lithuanian conservatives, who felt
threatened by the government’s “concessions to ethnic minorities,” which they thought
endangered ethnic Lithuanians’ “national and social achievements of independence.”159 After
1926, Jews subsequently lost almost all political power and representation, as the government
attempted to bolster the interests of ethnic Lithuanians at the expense of minorities. The Ministry
of Jewish Affairs was eliminated, and Jews were excluded from sections of the economy
controlled by the state, blocked from employment in the civil service, and discriminated against
in university admission processes.160 Thus, the marginalization of Jews as “others” was both
institutional and conceptual. With government protection, however, such attitudes infrequently
translated into widespread, public antisemitic violence, and it was punished appropriately when it
did. When a group of Lithuanians attacked Jews at a communist demonstration in Kovno in
August 1929, the attackers were taken to court and several were imprisoned.161
Economic competition stoked antisemitism throughout the 1930s, resulting in increasing
antisemitic rhetoric, which government officials spoke out against.162 Antisemitism significantly
intensified in 1938–1939, during which the government recorded a relatively high amount of
antisemitic violence. However, no fatalities resulting from such violence were recorded during
the interwar years.163 These trends contributed to attacks on Jewish students at the University of
Kaunas in March 1938, during which students publicly posted a copy of Der Stürmer, the
vehemently antisemitic paper published by the Nazi regime.164 In addition, in 1939, Lithuanian
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police identified attempts by Nazi Germany to spread antisemitic attitudes and incite antisemitic
violence.165 Sužiedėlis attributes the increase to the domestic and international political crises
occurring at the time and “the general fascination with fascism and radical ethnic nationalism
amongst certain intellectual circles characteristic of the later 1930s.”166
In addition to traditional, religious and economic antisemitism, the popular antisemitic
stereotype of associating Jews and communism proliferated in the late 1930s. The JudeoBolshevik myth had existed in Lithuania since the previous decade, first promulgated by rightwing groups in the mid-1920s as a part of anti-leftist propaganda which simultaneously
“appealed to fears of Bolshevism” and “Jewish domination.”167 The Lithuanian Communist Party
(LCP) aimed to overthrow the existing regime and unite Lithuania with the Soviet Union.
Therefore, under the Smetona regime it was banned as an anti-state organization, so the LCP
operated underground. Nonetheless, LCP membership increased in the 1930s, including the
numbers of Jews, who comprised 31 percent of the LCP in Lithuania and 70 percent in Kovno in
1939. Still, Eidintas says Jews’ active participation in the party was largely exaggerated.168
Paradoxically, economic instability in the 1930s also prompted the negative association of Jews
with capitalism, as many Jews were factory and business owners. 169 Sirutavičus sums up the
multiple, contradictory antisemitic perceptions of Jews in Lithuania in the late 1930s as such:
“Jews were accused of not being loyal to the state, they were said to be aligned with the
communist movement, they were reproached for dominating the economic sphere, and they were
considered to be of no social or economic benefit to Lithuanian society.”170 Still, in comparison
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to Jews in places such as Germany and Poland, Lithuanian Jews were indisputably “better
off.”171
While Jack Brauns lauded Jewish life in Kovno as a “Jewish renaissance,” and said that
“you didn’t feel the burden of being Jewish. In fact, it was a privilege,” his recollections of
associating mainly with Jews indicates that life for Jews in Kovno was not entirely privileged
and secure.172 He explained that his Jewish school had its own skating rink because “it was really
much more fun to be with your friends than having the fear – of antisemitism.”173 Morris Rich
experienced Lithuanians’ hatred of Jews “all the time” before the war. Ethnic Lithuanian
children threw stones as he and his Jewish friends walked home from school; if a Jew beat a nonJew in a soccer games or boxing match, Jews were at risk of being attacked afterwards.174
Another Holocaust survivor from Kovno, Ann Hirschberg, offered an explanation of the
survivors’ varying childhood experiences of antisemitism, and the seemingly common
experience of Jewish youth being at risk of antisemitic attacks, verbal and physical, in public.
She commented that “when you go to school with a girl and you sit with her and do your
homework with her she is going to be your friend,” but maybe the girl’s brother would not be
friendly. As evidence, she said that she went to a Lithuanian school and did not experience
antisemitism. Her brother, however, attended a Hebrew school and, identified as Jewish by his
school uniform, was beaten up by Gentile boys. 175 Evidently it was known that it was safer for
Jews to intentionally interact with non-Jews than for Jews and non-Jews to encounter each other
as strangers on the street.
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Others remembered Lithuanian antisemitism more clearly. Morris Rich declared that
Lithuania, “is one of the most antisemitic countries…in the world.”176 Perhaps such a comment
reflects hindsight, not direct memories of his experiences in Lithuania before 1941. But Anna
Gure also remembered that antisemitism was a widespread reality in interwar Kovno, recalling
that “Lithuanians were notoriously known as antisemites...my friends of course not in my
presence...but somehow we didn’t pay much attention to it…we had to survive so you know.”177
Antisemitism was so prevalent that Gure acknowledged that her Lithuanian friends may have
been antisemitic, but that did not affect their friendship. It seems to have been accepted as an
enduring condition of Jewish life in Lithuania. Waldemar Ginsburg made the distinction that a
different kind of antisemitism developed over the interwar years in Lithuania. Religious and
economic antisemitism had always existed, “but racial antisemitism was something new,” he
recalled. When Ginsburg studied architecture at Kaunas University in the late 1930s, he said “I
experienced for the first time antisemitic agitation and it came to me as a shock. It was the result
of a minority of students which were contaminated with the ideas of Nazi Germany.” 178
Lithuanians’ antisemitism was tolerated as part of life in Lithuania, as it did not disrupt daily life
or permeate all interactions between Jews and non-Jews. Even the “new” form of antisemitism
was not cause for alarm; it was shocking to experience for the first time, but it could be attributed
to foreign ideas, not local attitudes.
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Dangers at Home and Abroad
Despite the latent and at times overt presence of antisemitism, yet perhaps due to its
infrequent expression, Jews felt secure as Jews in Kovno. When asked if Jewish friends were
seeking to leave Kovno during the interwar years, Anna Gure asserted, “why should they leave?
They had a good life there, there was no question about it.” As a teenager, she said that she
thought life in Kovno “was boring like hell,” but her parents’ generation was “very content.”179
Older Jews such as Gure’s grandfather had chosen to live in Lithuania because it was perceived
to be better for Jews there than in other places, like the Soviet Union. Although Brauns described
how “very Jewish” Jews were in Kovno, and indicated that Jewish children avoided associating
with Lithuanian children due to fears of antisemitism, he maintained that Jews “were very proud
of Lithuanian culture.”180 Even Rich, despite his strong condemnation of Lithuanians’
antisemitism, declared that he had believed “it’s our country. I was born here.”181 In retrospect,
Brauns called the devotion of Jews to Lithuania a “tragedy,” but acknowledged that Jews stayed
in Lithuania because they saw no reason to leave, “the life in Lithuania was not really bad. It was
a very comfortable life.”182
Awareness of external events in Nazi Germany, and even the outbreak of World War II in
1939, did not drastically change this assessment of Jewish life in Lithuania or spur the
widespread notion that Jews were in danger and thus should attempt to leave. Neither did
testimonies indicate that Jews perceived the Soviet Union to be a major threat. Those who had
access to foreign-language newspapers or read German books were apparently aware of Nazism
and its implications for Jews. As a child Anna Gure was an avid reader of German literature, and
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commented that “all of the German authors were trying to tell the world what was going on, few
of our people listened.”183 Even Hitler himself had stated his intentions in Mein Kampf, which
Morris Rich’s father had read, which made him very concerned.184 Margaret Kagan and her
family had even travelled to Berlin, presumably sometime in the mid-1930s, and remembers
seeing the park benches designated for Jews only. However, despite her personal encounter with
Nazi antisemitism, there is no sense in her testimony that there was even the consideration that
her life in Lithuania as a Jew was threatened or she would be subjected to the same treatment.185
The arrival of refugees from Nazism was another source of information about the Nazi
regime which came straight to the Jews in Kovno. The first to come to the city were German
Jews in the 1930s, and then Polish Jews after war broke out in September 1939. Waldemar
Ginsburg recalled that the German Jews told “all the horror stories” and thus Kovno Jews were
“quite well-informed;” however, people were “complacent” and “optimistic, convinced that
people have learned their lesson and would not repeat the mistakes of the First World War.”186
Essentially, it was terrible what the German Jews were subjected to, but for the time being, it
remained a German problem. After Germany invaded Poland, Margaret Kagan recalled that the
arrival of Polish Jewish refugees in Kovno made them “much more aware of the problems of war
than we had been, of antisemitism before the war started.”187 They were aware of its effects on
others, perhaps, but it did not lead to having a sense of “doom” themselves as Jews in Kovno.188
Furthermore, the consequences of Nazi antisemitism were not yet fully known, even to Polish
refugees. Another Holocaust survivor from Kovno, Jerry Convoy, remembered that the refugees
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“did not know what was happening behind them. They only came in and say that the Germans
starting to organize ghettos and put all the Jews together….”189 Polish refugees knew some
details of Nazi persecution of Jews, but as this was still an unfolding policy such knowledge was
far from complete or consistent.
According to Jack Brauns, Jews in Kovno “opened every door possible…everything that
could be done for the refugees was done, from money, to lodging, to food,” but there was no
sense that the Jewish community in Lithuania themselves needed help at the moment.190 As such,
a well-known story regarding helping Jews leave Lithuania involves Jewish refugees, not Jewish
Lithuanians. Chiune Sugihara, a Japanese diplomat in the Japanese consulate in Kovno, helped
Jewish refugees travel eastwards by granting transit visas through the Soviet Union to Japan,
contrary to official Japanese orders to cease. Before he was ordered to leave Lithuania in
September 1940, Sugihara was able to issue over 2,000 visas throughout the previous year.
Jack Brauns personally met Sugihara. While on summer vacation in a resort town on the
coast of Lithuania, Brauns’s family had befriended a German-Jewish family who needed transit
visas through the Soviet Union. Brauns’s father used his diplomatic connections to invite
Sugihara to have dinner at the Brauns’s home with the German family. Brauns remembered that
the family spoke of the “horrors” of living in Germany, “how the Jews couldn’t get this, and how
they were beaten on the street,” but said that he couldn’t fully comprehend the stories he heard,
because “our life was not touched.”191 Jewish life in Lithuania must have seemed so different, so
secure in comparison. Similarly, Ginsburg said others did not have the same sense that events in
Germany would affect their lives in Lithuania. They were “aware of the two superpowers getting
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more belligerent on each side of us,” but, “people who live in peaceful circumstances…don’t
usually like to dwell on the unpleasant aspects of life…we thought it can’t happen here. It will
happen everywhere else but not here.” In hindsight, he added, “that was our big mistake.”192
Evaluations of the perceived threats to Jewish life in Kovno varied, even within families.
Although it was known that Jews were suffering in areas under German occupation, the
speculation that the same could happen in Kovno was unsubstantiated and contemplating leaving
seemed irrational to those comfortable with their lives in Kovno. Some Jews, like Morris Rich’s
father did, however, believe that their lives would be soon be put in peril. According to Rich, his
father had told his mother “we don’t have a chance to hang around Lithuania,” likening the Jews’
situation to “standing on an iceberg which is melting under our feet. And it’s going to melt. And
we are all going to be sunk, and drowned, and dead, and murdered.” For whatever reason, Rich’s
father had more foresight than most of the possible extent of Nazi terror. Before war broke out in
1939, his father “begged” his mother to emigrate to the United States, but she pointed out that
richer Jews were building factories and not leaving, so why should they. So, they stayed.193 After
1939, Anna Gure also tried to convince a family member that they should try to leave Lithuania.
She had “read German literature and newspapers and I was quite aware what was going on and I
was frightened to death.” When she expressed her fears to her father, he refused to leave, he
“didn’t want to wander anymore.”194 Jews had been subjected to forms of persecution in Europe
for centuries. Perhaps many Jews evaluated the information they had and considered some
possibility that life would become more difficult, but ultimately determined that life in Kovno
would be livable.
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For many of those who decided they should leave, they could not. Although she wanted
to leave, Anna Gure said that she was not aware of many opportunities to do so, but also did not
try.195 Waldemar Ginsburg made efforts to emigrate to America, but it would have taken ten
years for him to receive a visa.196 Jack Brauns’s parents also thought about going to America but
were told it was a minimum five-year wait. British Mandate Palestine was another popular
destination for Lithuanian Jews, but the British government restricted Jewish immigration.
Unfortunately, for many like Brauns and Ginsburg, almost all doors leading out of Lithuania
were closed, even for those ready to leave.

The Soviet Occupation: “Between the red devil and the brown devil”
After Lithuania lost its independence and became the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist
Republic in summer 1940, the accompanying Sovietization policies completely disrupted all
aspects of life. Lithuanian society became “quickly atomized and traditional social bonds [were]
broken.” Interethnic relations significantly worsened, as Jews became even more so negatively
identified with communism and the Soviet regime. 197 This misperception ignored the fact that
Jews suffered from Sovietization as well. The notion that Jews were colluding with the Soviets
and exploiting Lithuanians was in part stoked by foreign-produced propaganda, such as that
distributed by the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF). The extent of the LAF’s influence in
Lithuania is indeterminable, but Sužiedėlis does not place much emphasis on the existence of
antisemitic and anti-Soviet propaganda or the connection between the LAF and the Nazi regime.
Rather, he asserts that the LAF’s “increasingly strident antisemitism was partly a reaction to the
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mood back home, which was a distorted response to a real tragedy, and needed little prodding
from ‘foreign influences.’”198 Anger towards perceived Jewish collaboration with the Soviets
increased in mid–June 1941, when the Soviets arrested and deported 18,000 Lithuanians.199
Despite the large number of Jews also taken away, some Lithuanians blamed the Jews for what
happened because a few Jews had been members of the committee responsible for the
deportations.200 According to Sužiedėlis, these deportations “pushed an already anxious
Lithuanian society over the edge.”201
During the Soviet Occupation of Lithuania, Russia and Germany were partners in the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the following Boundary and Friendship Treaty. Not only did
populations under Soviet rule believe that the specter of a war between the two powers was
lessened, the Soviet press and radio also censored any negative information about the Nazis’
treatment of Jews in German-occupied Poland. As Lithuania was still independent in fall 1939,
Jews in Kovno could have been more aware of conditions in German-occupied Poland; the
country only fell under Soviet censorship in mid-1940. In addition, in autumn 1939, tens of
thousands of refugees, many of them Jews, streamed across the border into Lithuania. Many
passed through Kovno.202 Yet information about the Nazis’ mistreatment of Jews may not have
been believable to Kovno Jews who encountered refugees.
Historians looking at the impact of Soviet censorship of news of Nazism on Jews in the
Soviet Union mostly focus on Soviet-occupied eastern Poland, as does Ben-Cion Pinchuk, or the
pre-1939 borders of the Soviet Union, as does Mordechai Altshuler and others. In his study of
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Jews in Soviet Belarus, Jeffrey Koerber asserts that although Jews knew about the events of
Kristallnacht in 1938, news of persecution of Jews in German-occupied areas after fall 1939 was
limited and replaced by rumors, which were often dismissed.203 If such limited information was
given credence at all, Altshuler says it was only clear that Jews “had been thrown to the wolves”
under Nazi rule, but more specifics were unknown or unknowable.204 Furthermore, although the
Soviet press published some information in spring 1940 suggesting that Germany posed a
military threat, Jews’ sense of insecurity under Soviet rule was lessened by Soviet “propaganda
reinforcing trust in the strength of the Red Army.”205 No matter what information Jews may have
received in Kovno, the genocide of European Jews with the aim of extermination, was not yet in
the minds of Jews anywhere in Europe, nor in the plans of the Nazis themselves, as this endeavor
did not begin until the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.206 Although testimonies discuss
impressions of the Nazi threat to the west, before June 1940 they do not mention fearing their
neighbor to the east.
For all of Lithuanian society, Jews and non-Jews alike, “life was turned upside down”
after the Soviets occupied Lithuania in June 1940.207 Although Lithuania was only under Soviet
Occupation for a year, the experience significantly exacerbated interethnic tensions, as Jews
were accused of benefitting from the Soviet regime and being responsible for Lithuanian
suffering under Sovietization policies. When looking at the violence which erupted in June 1941,
in comparison to the lack of overt and violent expressions of antisemitism Jews had experienced
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in Lithuania and their relatively peaceful relations with non-Jews before the Soviet Occupation,
it is clear that the year of occupation severely disturbed Lithuanian society. Although
Lithuanians understandably felt animosity toward the Soviets, they misattributed and misdirected
their troubles to a familiar scapegoat. Ultimately, after a year, Jews arguably suffered the worst
consequences of the Soviet Occupation. When asked if there was a change in the level of
antisemitism during the occupation, Anna Gure remembered, “Yes, of course. All the Jews were
communists…they said it freely, all the Jews are communists.”208 Such sentiments were not new,
but they did become more prevalent and virulent during this period and would later become
lethal for some Jews in Kovno, including Gure’s grandfather.
Some Jews, as well as some Lithuanians, welcomed the arrival of the Soviets. For Jews,
Soviet rule was beneficial to an extent, it promised protection from the Nazis and possibilities for
career opportunities not afforded to them under Smetona’s nationalist policies.209 In reality, of
course, not all Jews desired communist rule. As previously noted, many families had had
negative experiences under communism after the Russian Revolution and had fled to Lithuania.
For those families, the period of Soviet Occupation was fear-filled. Ginsburg’s stepfather was
one such refugee; he apparently did not hide his scorn for the Soviets and therefore the family
feared they would be arrested and deported.210 Anna Gure’s grandfather had a “devastating”
experience with Soviet communism, and her family had “a great deal of fear” throughout that
year of occupation.211 Such families were not afraid because they were Jewish, although Jewish
institutions and Jewish businessmen and property owners were negatively affected by
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Sovietization policies. For well-off Jews or those who were known anti-communists, their
primary fear was arrest and deportation to Siberia as “bourgeoisie” enemies.
Even for Jews like Margaret Kagan’s mother who “hated the Soviets,” there was a sense
that Lithuania was “wedged between the red devil and the brown devil and inevitably…would
get crushed by one or the other.” Therefore, her mother “was very ambivalent, she certainly was
unhappy to be under the Soviets but nobody wanted to be under the Germans.”212 Anna Gure
also remembered it being a “very unhappy time;” her father’s business was nationalized, and was
sent to a new job in the provinces.213 But, although it became a “different life,” it “was still a
life.” Jack Brauns clarified, “there was still food on the table. Nobody beat anybody up, and it
was still a modus vivendi.”214 As Morris Rich remembered, life did not change much for him
under the Soviet Occupation as “the poor people…didn’t have anything to lose,” but he noted
that the secularization affected religious institutions, which was “not a happy outcome.” 215
Not only was life “wedged between the red devil and the brown devil” unhappy for Jews,
it was also nearly impossible to escape if they so desired. There were even fewer possibilities to
leave Lithuania than before the Soviets entered. War raged to the west and the eastern border
with the Soviet Union was closed; travel through the Soviet Union to other destinations was only
possible if one had a transit visa, which was difficult to obtain.216 In addition to not being able to
leave, Kovno Jews may not have wanted to do so. Ostensibly, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and
the perceived strength of the Red Army protected Soviet occupied-territories from the Germans.
Jerry Convoy remembered that his father said that what was happening to Jews in Nazi-occupied
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Poland would “never happen” in Kovno because “the Russians are here and [the Germans]
would not dare to come into Kovno to occupy it.”217 Accordingly, some Jews were more afraid
of Soviet deportations than of a possible impending Nazi invasion. In an ironic twist of fate,
those who were deported to Siberia and imprisoned in gulags were saved from what would
happen when the Germans surprised the world and invaded the Soviet Union. Jews in Kovno
would not only be surprised by the invasion, which they had feared, but experienced further
shock when they realized they then had to fear the local Lithuanians as well.

Conclusion
An examination of Jews’ lives in interwar Kovno highlights the unprecedented nature of
the events that would unfold in the first weeks following the German invasion. The level of
integration and interaction between Jews and non-Jews varied based on a family’s
socioeconomic status and schools attended by children. Jews and non-Jews were friends and
colleagues, but some Jews mostly socialized with other Jewish families. Although some Jews
experienced antisemitism, they did not perceive it to be a life-threatening phenomenon.
Knowledge about the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany was disturbing, but there was a sense
that nothing like that could happen in Kovno.
The Soviet Occupation in June 1940 initiated a crisis period, severely destabilizing
Lithuanian society. Sovietization negatively impacted Jews and non-Jews alike, but Jews were
perceived negatively by Lithuanians as communist sympathizers and collaborators. Jews did
seem to have the sense that Soviet rule was preferable to Nazi occupation, although they only
had limited knowledge of what was happening to Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland since the war
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began in 1939. Those who discussed or attempted to leave Lithuania based their decisions on the
perceived threat of Nazi Germany to Jewish life in Lithuania, yet there was not yet the sense that
a German invasion constituted a mortal threat. In Kovno, Jews had actively interpreted their
experience during the interwar years and had asserted their sense of agency in their decisions to
integrate into Lithuanian society, decisions which relied on what was known about what it meant
to be a Jew in Lithuania. It could not have been known that the situation would change so
drastically, overnight, on June 22, 1941.

66

3 Clarity of Insight and Total
Blindness: Jews’ Perceptions and
Actions during the Kovno Pogroms
Jewish accounts of the violence experienced in the days following the German invasion
of the Soviet Union exemplify what Saul Friedländer describes as “the clarity of insight and the
total blindness of human beings confronted with an entirely new and utterly horrifying
reality.”218 Jews had the clarity that an invasion would put them in danger, but initially they were
totally blindsided by the reality that it was local Lithuanians who posed an immediate threat.
While attempting to comprehend that new reality, Kovno Jews simultaneously navigated the
chaotic environment of the pogroms and took action based on their knowledge and perception of
events and what they believed would help them survive.
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Friedländer reminds us that Jews “did not
understand what was ultimately in store for them.” Even if they did have some sense of what was
to come from a German invasion, “in terms of reactions and initiatives, expecting terrible
hardship and even widespread death is one thing, expecting immediate murder, quite another.”219
Yet the situation Kovno Jews faced following the German invasion was even more horrifyingly
unprecedented, because they held no expectations of immediate murder, nor that it would come
at the hands of local Lithuanians. Given the impossibility of foresight, Friedländer emphasizes
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the need to recognize that “any steps taken by Jews in order to hamper the Nazi effort to
eradicate every single one of them represented a direct countermove.”220 However, the Kovno
pogroms were not the consequence of the Nazis’ extermination policy, which had not yet been
formally launched but would soon begin in the Lithuanian provinces. Rather, Kovno Jews had to
take steps and make countermoves to avoid the Lithuanians who were participating in the
pogroms, whose efforts were significantly more disordered than the Nazis’.
Local Lithuanians held significant responsibility for the violence unleashed against Jews
over the two-week period, June 22 – July 6, 1941, following the onset of the German invasion.
Pogroms began before the Germans arrived in Kovno, soon after news broke of their invasion of
the Soviet Union. On June 23, a Lithuanian Provisional Government was established in Kovno,
which organized the Lithuanian army and police.221 Accordingly, Christoph Dieckmann and
Saulius Sužiedėlis write that “it can be assumed with a fair degree of certainty that the hastily
reorganized security and criminal police in Kaunas also participated in the arrests” of Jews.
Identified by their white armbands, Lithuanian partisans roamed the city, targeting not only those
Jews they found on the streets but also Jews sheltering in their homes. In addition to arresting,
robbing, and harming Jews, Lithuanians also publicly humiliated their victims.222
While Lithuanians targeting Jews were loosely organized and acted on their own initiative
in the first few days, the pogroms reached “their terrible fury and extent” in the days following
the arrival of the Germans. The first German soldiers reached Kovno in the evening of June 24.
SS commander Franz Stahlecker, head of Einsatzgruppe A, entered the city soon after in the
early hours of June 25 with an Einsatzgruppen unit, SK 1B; he encouraged the continuation of
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the Lithuanians’ actions.223 That night, from June 25 to June 27, the most intense violence of the
pogroms took place in the suburb of Slobodka. Historians and eyewitness accounts alike describe
the Lithuanians’ actions as incredibly brutal. Jews were shot and stabbed, their bodies were
mutilated, synagogues were vandalized, and homes were set on fire (Figure 3).224 Because
photographic evidence of the event exists, the most well-known tragedy of the Kovno pogroms is
the Lietūkis Garage massacre on June 27. Several Lithuanian perpetrators humiliated, tortured,
and killed about 60 Jewish men as a crowd of both Lithuanian civilians and Germans soldiers
watched.225 On June 28, the Germans disarmed the Lithuanian partisan groups and established
local police battalions.226

Figure 3- Vandalized Kovno synagogue with a body lying across a bench
(Source: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)
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Approximately 1,000 Jews were killed during that first week. Another 5,000 more Jews
(mostly Jewish men) were murdered in the second week, June 30 –July 6, in mass executions,
primarily carried out at the Seventh Fort. German and Lithuanians collaborated in this second
phase of massacres. On July 6, however, members of both the German Wehrmacht and Security
Police forces voiced their disapproval of the Lithuanians’ behavior during the murders. The
Germans subsequently asserted total control over the treatment of Jews in the Kovno and
thereafter systemized and supervised all future mass murder operations in Lithuania and other
newly occupied areas.227
The shocking and chaotic first week of pogroms prompted Kovno’s Jews to improvise
survival strategies. Jews demonstrated their agency in the various “countermoves” they made.
First, following the onset of the German invasion but before the pogroms began, Jews decided
whether to stay or flee, depending on their perceptions of the Nazi threat and opportunities
available to them. Amidst the chaos of the ensuing pogroms, Jews relied on their personal
experiences and perceptions of Lithuanians’ motivations in their evaluation of unfolding events
to guide their actions and decisions. In this dangerous, disordered environment, some Jews
moved locations in attempts to avoid harm. The primary survival technique Kovno Jews
possessed was one of avoidance through hiding in their homes. Unfortunately, staying inside did
not always protect them, as partisans broke in, ostensibly to search for “communists,” to loot and
kill the Jewish inhabitants. Therefore, by early July, Jews began to view the Germans’ order to
establish a ghetto as a survival strategy in itself, a place where, amongst fellow Jews, they would
not have to hide from the constant threat of death. Those Jews who were arrested and taken to
the Seventh Fort also demonstrated agency but had less chances to do so. While Jews had
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agency, their countermoves ultimately were effective or ineffective often only by chance. In this
tumultuous period, random encounters often determined the positive or negative outcomes of
agentive action.
Survivor testimonies, which, as we have seen, offer much detail about Jewish life in
interwar Lithuania, also describe the profound contrast between life before and after June 22,
1941. According to survivor Sonia Stern, “life wasn’t bad” before the war broke out, but then
“the whole country went crazy.”228 In addition to tracing the experiences of many of those
survivors discussed in the previous chapter, I supplement personal experiences with
contemporary written accounts which describe the collective experience of Kovno’s Jews during
the pogroms and illustrate how utterly horrifying their new reality was. This chapter establishes
how they confronted it. First, how did Jews respond to the news of the German invasion? Then,
how did Jews react when the first violence they experienced came at the hands of local
Lithuanians? What did Jews understand about the Lithuanians’ motivations for attacking Jews?
How did Jews’ knowledge and perceptions of events during the pogroms inform the survival
strategies they decided to employ? Did Jews perceive the local Lithuanian attackers and invading
Germans differently? How did Jews view the Germans in the wake of the Lithuanian pogroms?

The German Invasion and Kovno Jews’ “fateful decision”
The German invasion of the Soviet Union came as a surprise. Although feared and
somewhat anticipated, the attack caught Red Army forces completely off guard. With no time to
mount an immediate defensive strategy, most military units rapidly retreated eastwards. The
invasion caught civilians by surprise as well; when the war broke out some Jewish children, such
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as Margaret Kagan’s younger brother, were at summer camps outside of Kovno. Twelve-yearold Nechama Shneorson was also away at camp. The sound of German bombs woke the children
and they were rushed back to the city.
Even before violence began, the expected arrival of the Germans meant Kovno Jews
needed to decide whether to stay or try to flee eastward. When Nechama Shneorson was reunited
with her family, her parents explained that they would “have to try to run away” because they
believed if they stayed, the Germans would do to them what they heard had happened to Polish
Jews.229 The next day, as the family fled east towards the Russian border, they followed in the
path of the retreating Red Army and thousands of civilian refugees. But those fleeing seldom got
far.230 The German advance was so rapid that Wehrmacht forces frequently overran refugee
columns, forcing them to turn back. The Shneorsons, for example, made it only about 80
kilometers before they turned back when they realized that there was “nowhere to escape
anymore.” 231 Unfortunately for them and thousands of others, they could not return to their
homes. Many returning Jews were captured and imprisoned, mostly at the Seventh Fort.232 Their
fate is discussed later in this chapter.
Although fearful of the dangers posed by the Germans, flight was not an immediately
clear choice for some Jews. On June 22, Anna Gure’s extended family members gathered
together, “waiting” to see what would happen.233 Waldemar Ginsburg’s family spent that day “in
a panic”; fourteen family members gathered together to “make the fateful decision,” whether to
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stay or flee.234 His stepfather wanted to follow the retreating Russians, since he thought it would
be better to “take his chances with the devil he knows.” Other family members, however,
recalled their positive experience under German occupation of Lithuania during the First World
War and thus believed “the Germans aren’t so bad.” Life might become “difficult,” they
reasoned, but it would be “better than living under the Communists.”235 Ultimately the family
decided to stay in Kovno. Of those gathered that day, Waldemar was the only one to survive the
war. 236 Jack Brauns’s father turned down the opportunity to flee. He was a highly respected
doctor, and the Soviets had arranged a car to evacuate the family. Yet when the car arrived the
next day, he decided that he would not abandon his patients, and the family would stay.237

“Trouble came from a direction which we did not expect”
When Jews made the decision to stay or flee, it was in response to the German invasion.
The threat that local Lithuanians posed to Jews proved to be an unanticipated and much more
immediate danger. Thus, the pogroms were just as surprising as the invasion itself, if not more
so. When Waldemar Ginsburg’s family decided to remain in Kovno they had expected trouble
from the Germans, “but the trouble came from a direction which we did not expect.”238 Although
scholars would later debate whether Lithuanians independently initiated the pogroms, Jews
clearly recalled this to be the case. Holocaust survivor testimonies attest to the fact Lithuanians
started targeting Jews before German forces arrived in the city. When recounting the first few
days of the pogroms, Jack Brauns emphasized that many Jews “were killed at that period of time,
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before the Germans came.”239 Abraham Resnick also recalled this sequence of events, asserting
“before the Germans came in, you should know that the Lithuanians became like beasts.”240
While the killings intensified after the Germans arrived in the city, the first days of violence
constituted a terrifying initiation for Kovno Jews. The fact that Lithuanians independently
attacked Jews was disconcerting yet eye-opening.
Kovno Jews seem to have quickly understood Lithuanians’ actions as a consequence of
the Soviet retreat, which left Jews vulnerable in ways they had not been under Soviet or interwar
Lithuanian rule. The disintegration of local rule permitted Lithuanians to release latent hatreds,
without fear of consequence. Anna Gure described how “immediately almost the Lithuanians
bloomed” after the Soviets retreated.241 According to Morris Rich, Kovno became a “free city.”
Lithuanians were free from Soviet rule and thus free to act out their repressed aggression, so they
“right away took that for a good opportunity to start killing.”242 Avraham Tory wrote in his
wartime diary that, after the Soviets retreated, the Jews of Kovno were “left behind as fair
game.”243 Similarly, the Jewish ghetto policemen who wrote The Clandestine History while
imprisoned in the Kovno Ghetto characterized the status of Jews in the city as having become
“hefker,” like abandoned property, “any non-Jew could do with us as he pleased.”244
Jack Brauns explained that the chaos of the invasion gave Lithuanians “an opportunity to
kill the Jews” because “there was nobody…who would protect the Jews.”245 Indeed, the newly
restored Lithuanian leadership in the city either directed, participated, or were complicit in the
violence. Kovno was the center of an anti-Soviet uprising, led by the Lithuanian Activist Front
239
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(LAF). The LAF was a Lithuanian right-wing nationalist group which had been headquartered in
Berlin during the Soviet Occupation, preparing to restore Lithuanian independence following an
eventual German invasion of the Soviet Union. On June 23, a leader of the LAF declared
Lithuania’s independence and announced the establishment of a provisional government. 246
However, the group was not entirely responsible for the violence that erupted throughout the
city.247 Historian Christoph Dieckmann notes how the violence that erupted in the wake of the
German invasion was “the result of a combination of central planning and local spontaneous
action,” but “communication difficulties proved to be too great for direct coordination of the
entire uprising.”248 Despite their lack of central coordination, Lithuanian partisans were loosely
organized in various groups and could be commonly identified by the white armbands they
wore.249
After the invasion began and the Germans bombed targets outside the city, Margaret
Kagan’s family took shelter in a cellar with Gentile neighbors. Those hiding heard a Lithuanian
military leader’s radio announcement declaring that for every German soldier harmed, one
hundred Jews would be shot in reprisal.250 She “remembers her father’s face and reaction” when
he heard that, it was a “revelation.”251 Such public, explicit antisemitic agitation by Lithuanian
officials may have been a surprise to Margaret Kagan’s family, but the Lithuanians’ anti-Soviet
uprising had actually been “long-prepared,” according to Dieckmann.252 Holocaust survivor
Morris Rich recalled details that support this. In response to an interviewer’s question about who
armed the Lithuanians during the pogroms, Rich replied, “The Lithuanians” armed themselves,
246

Dieckmann, “Lithuania in Summer 1941- The German Invasion and Kaunas Pogrom,” 358.
Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence, 98.
248
Dieckmann, “Lithuania in Summer 1941- The German Invasion and Kaunas Pogrom,” 373.
249
Dieckmann, “Lithuania in Summer 1941- The German Invasion and Kaunas Pogrom,” 374.
250
Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews, 118.
251
Kagan, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, segment 14.
252
Dieckmann, “Lithuania in Summer 1941- The German Invasion and Kaunas Pogrom,” 373.
247

75

adding that “they were preparing already for years in the underground.253 He substantiates this
claim with the recollection that his family believed their neighbor, a Mr. Mazuras, had been
some sort of “organizer,” as “a lot of Lithuanian Gentile people used to come to his home.” He
had also been seen digging in his yard and Rich’s father had commented that he hoped he was
not burying weapons. 254Although perceptive, it is doubtful the Rich family comprehended or
contemplated that those Lithuanians next door were organizing to attack Jews.
Lithuanian partisans quickly generated chaos in the city by looting Jewish homes and
brutally and indiscriminately killing and arresting Jews, mostly men. Even so, in the beginning,
the violence was believed to be “a passing event,” a consequence of the chaotic invasion and the
Soviets’ retreat.255 Margaret Kagan lived along one of the main roads the Soviet army was using
to retreat, which is how she became aware of the partisans’ activities. She recalled, “they get
these white armbands and they called themselves LAF...and they start immediately shooting into
the backs of the retreating Russians and they start raiding Jewish homes.” After her father had an
upsetting personal encounter with a passing partisan, they “seriously contemplated leaving
Lithuania.” While the German invasion had not provided enough impetus, the ensuing
Lithuanian violence motivated some Jews to consider fleeing. Her father even obtained a cart
and horse; however, her mother refused to leave. Kagan’s younger brother had not yet returned
from the summer camp he had been at, so his whereabouts were unknown. Also, her mother was
convinced the war would not last long, “so we all stayed,” Kagan explained.256 Anna Gure
remembered that the initial exposure to Lithuanian violence was very frightening, “to say the
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least,” but Kovno Jews “still didn’t realize how bad” their situation would become.257 If Jews
had tried to flee east due to the newly recognized local threat, they would have been unable to
get far. They would likely have been turned back and arrested like the Shneorson family.
Although most Jews could not have been aware of the full extent of the Lithuanians’
activities, nor their true motivations, others determined they were targeted for allegedly being
“communists” or simply to loot their property. Morris Rich remembered that there were two
separate kinds of Lithuanian perpetrators. The first were “educated,” they “killed and walked
away, with guns, with pistols.” The second group “killed the Jews and…robbed them,” and
“slaughtered like…butchers.”258 While Rich made a distinction between perpetrators’ actions,
those who looted and those who killed, Waldemar Ginsburg had a monolithic explanation for
Lithuanians’ motivations. According to him, they “decided to exorcise the trauma of Soviet
terror by a massacre of the Jews, it was as simple as that.” He had heard Lithuanian Provisional
Government radio “propaganda” calling for retribution against the “Jewish traitors who betrayed
Lithuania to the communists.” As he explained, they “accused the Jews of being in league with
the communists and all the Jews were branded as communists”259 Not only were Jews branded as
communists, as Ginsburg recalled, Jews were murdered for this very reason. Anna Gure noted
the preposterous situation in which her grandfather was killed, “not as a Jew but as a Jew and a
communist, a man who was running from the communists was killed as one.”260 Gure’s
comments reflects the permeation of the Jewish-Bolshevik myth among many Lithuanians; if
Gure’s grandfather was indeed killed for allegedly being a communist, it did not matter to those
who murdered him that their victim had despised the Soviets.
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Jews also understood looting and opportunism to be significant motives for Lithuanians;
as Avraham Tory described, Lithuanians realized that “hunting [Jews] is not unprofitable.”
Besides, it was easier to steal from dead Jews.261 During the first days following the invasion,
Jack Brauns helped in the Jewish hospital where his father worked, encountering many looting
victims there. Corroborating Tory’s allegations, Brauns remembered that “people were
massacred in their homes for the purpose of stealing their goods.”262 Anna Gure recalled that the
Lithuanians specifically targeted wealthy Jews, they “didn’t care about the ones who lived
modestly, they cared about the Jews who lived well because this is where they could grab
whatever they could find.”263 Since killing often accompanied looting, Jews were fortunate if
they lost their property but not their lives. Abraham Resnick’s relatives’ house was looted, and
he was later told that although the intruders had wanted to “kill and to take away my Aunt’s
brothers,” the family “fortunately, they had some watches, and they were able to bribe those
people who came in.”264 Other Jews were less fortunate. At the hospital, Jack Brauns witnessed
Jews who survived looting, but suffered from “maliciously inflicted injuries by marauders.” He
himself almost became a victim when he visited a friend a few days after the invasion and the
residence was raided while Brauns was there. Partisans took all the Jewish men from the building
down to the courtyard and stood them against a wall. Brauns realized they would likely soon be
shot, but his agency was restricted and his fate seemed unavoidable.265 However, he and others
avoided that fate due to coincidental timing, which will be explained later.
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“The ever-present danger of death”
Lithuanians’ motivations were mixed, and their actions were not centrally coordinated.
Such unpredictability made it difficult for Jews to interpret events and act accordingly in their
own self interests. What was clear was that Jews were in danger, simply because they were Jews.
Because they could not change that circumstance, Jews in Kovno exercised agency by
developing survival strategies. They made choices and decisions not only based on perceptions
of Lithuanians’ motivations, but also their limited but growing knowledge and experience of the
threats they faced as Jews. Because they learned that going outside was dangerous, many Jews
tried to anticipate where they would be safest, and most felt safest in their homes. Yet even this
survival strategy was not always successful.
Because the threat they faced was unexpected, Jews went outside during the first days of
the pogroms when German planes were not conducting air raids. They quickly realized that
going outside was deadly if someone encountered the wrong people on the streets. According to
Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis, “as of 25 June, any Jew who appeared in public was in danger.”266
Holocaust survivor Charles Anolik’s family repeatedly suffered the consequences of this new,
terrible reality. He later recounted that his younger brother attempted to flee, “and of course they
caught him and killed him.” His uncle went outside to “get his sister and…he got caught on the
bridge and they shot him.” His cousins, too, were caught outside, arrested, and killed at the Ninth
Fort. 267 Morris Rich’s father was captured by partisans on “the first day.” His father was arrested
as he was going to see if the trains were operating; he was later killed at the Seventh Fort.268
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During this same period Margaret Kagan’s father also left the shelter of their home in order to
return his keys to his office and “never came back.” His daughter later learned that he had been
killed as part of the infamous Lietūkis Garage massacre. Kagan reflected on her father’s concern
about returning a set of keys, questioning, “in retrospect is that a commonsense thing to do?”269
At the time it was not irrational. Jews were just learning the danger that came from being on the
street.
Although Jack Brauns described that walking on the street for a Jew was “almost a death
sentence,” it was not always one.270 Kagan’s mother had left their home, was arrested, and
returned home safely because an important Lithuanian partisan she knew recognized her where
she was being held and “saved” her, a phenomenon which will be explored further in the next
chapter.271 Such a positive outcome, however, depended largely on who Jews encountered.
Brauns recalled that it was especially risky for young men, if they were unlucky and encountered
“a few of the people, they would take out a knife and stab you right on the street.”272 If a Jew
happened to avoid “a few of the people,” Lithuanians seeking to attack Jews, he or she might
return home safely.
While some Holocaust survivors had family members that went outside and never
returned home, most did not know what happened to their loved ones. As Avraham Tory wrote
in his contemporaneous account, Jews caught by partisans and not killed on the spot were
“dragged away in groups to unknown destinations.”273 Neither Morris Rich nor Margaret Kagan
knew their father’s fates until much later. Both survivors said they heard “rumors” that their
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fathers were alive, doing hard labor somewhere, when they were in fact already dead.274 Kagan
did not learn her father’s fate until after the war, that he had been killed “that close to the 22 [of
June].” Her family had been told that her father had “been sorting archives in east Prussia,” and
therefore she questions whether that was a deliberately planted rumor by the Germans.275 Until
Rich found out the truth nine months after his father’s disappearance, he held out hope that his
father would return. Until Jews were confined in the Kovno Ghetto, Rich went to his friend’s
two-story house every day to keep watch for his father to return.276
After recognizing that local Lithuanians posed a threat, some Jews believed they would
be safer if they moved locations. As with other choices made during this time, such decisions
were based on Jews’ limited knowledge. These were risky moves in retrospect. After deciding
not to flee, Jack Brauns’s family left their home and “took shelter” for several days in the
hospital his father worked at until “the situation became a little quieter.”277 Some families placed
their children in environments they thought were safer. Because Anna Gure’s family was welloff and believed that the Lithuanians were targeting wealthy Jews, the family sent her little
brother to live with her maternal grandparents who lived more modestly.278 Soon after the
invasion, Morris Rich’s mother though it would be “safer to live in the Jewish section” than
where they lived, so she sent him to stay with his grandmother. 279 When Rich saw the Germans
arrive in Kovno a few days later, however, he went back to his own home. By doing so, he
fortuitously but inadvertently avoided the pogroms that later took place in his grandmother’s
neighborhood in Slobodka.
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In the days between the Soviet retreat and the establishment of German control in Kovno,
Avraham Tory recorded Jews’ overwhelming “fear that death lies in wait for them around every
corner.”280 Many families tried to anticipate where they would be safest. Most chose to remain in
their own homes. The indiscriminate, unceasing nature of the pogroms prompted this strategy.
The knowledge that when “the people went out to the street…they would never come back”
motivated survivors like Abraham Resnick “to stay home as much as possible.” 281 Morris Rich’s
mother decided that they should start hiding after his brother found the family that operated the
nearby bakery on the floor of the shop, “all laying in a puddle of blood and all the throats were
sliced.” When he returned to recount what he had seen, their mother initially responded, “Don’t
talk like that. How do you know? Maybe you didn’t see good.”282 The situation was
incomprehensible to her, and thus she almost automatically discounted her son’s story. Those
Jews who were not murdered or arrested, who witnessed or experienced the Lithuanians’ terror,
had to learn how to cope with their new reality. When possible, they also attempted to telephone
their friends and relatives to warn them of places in the city that might be dangerous.283 With
such knowledge and experiences, The Clandestine History revealed that “Jews who by chance
did not end up in the fort or in the garages, or in similar places, sat for weeks in their dwellings,
afraid to stick their noses out into the street because of the ever-present danger of death.”284
Avraham Tory confirmed in his diary that Jews “disappeared from the streets and from the life of
the city. Now they are cooped up in cellars and other hideouts.”285 At Morris Rich’s
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grandmother’s house, his relatives literally hid in the cellar and covered the entrance to it with a
carpet, table, and chairs.286
If not for this extra level of protection, Rich’s relatives may have been discovered by
Lithuanian partisans who broke into the home. Not finding their intended targets, the intruders
decided the Jewish residents might be hiding in the nearby synagogue and decided to go there.
The Jews in the nearby synagogue were subsequently murdered.287 Tory’s description of
partisans as “a pack of bloodthirsty dogs” who “prowled the streets and courtyards, seizing
panic-stricken Jews who had managed to find various hiding places” appears accurate.288 Thus,
even staying off the streets was no guarantee of safety. Anna Gure’s family was targeted in their
home three separate times. The first time, the partisans entered the home under the “pretext” that
someone was shooting from the window. Anna was taken away with her father and uncle to the
Seventh Fort.289 Luckily, they were soon released, unharmed, and returned home. A day or two
later, the home was raided again, and the family was once more taken outside, but this time put
against a wall. Gure recalled how the Lithuanians walked back and forth threateningly with their
rifles, and she fully expected the would be shot. Instead they were once again left unharmed.
After what felt like a long time, they were told they could go back into their home. She
characterized the experience as “an orgy of torture,” indicating that she believes the Lithuanians
got pleasure out of treating the Jews in such ways. She reasoned that the partisans came to their
home because “they knew who was there,” that Jews lived there.290 The third time the family was

286

Rich, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, segment 39.
Rich, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, segments 40-41.
288
Tory, Surviving the Holocaust, 8.
289
Gure, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, segments 45-46.
290
Gure, USC Shoah Foundation Institute, segments 48-49.
287

83

targeted, about a week after the Germans entered Kovno, the entire family was forced out of their
home and sent to the Ninth Fort, where the male family members were subsequently killed.291
When an interviewer asked Gure if what she experienced was like anything she had seen
before, she replied, “No of course not...it was incredible.”292 While she believes that “the
Germans told [the Lithuanians] what to do,” she asserted that “the Lithuanians did it on their
own, they knew what to do.” She described the Lithuanians as “real savages,” a description
frequently reiterated in other written accounts and survivor testimonies.293 In reference to when
her family was taken out of their home and placed against a wall, Gure commented that “the
sadism was unreal.”294 The Clandestine History similarly purported that “many
murders…happened only out of sadism.”295 When describing the attacks in Slobodka, the
contemporaneous account recounted that Lithuanians “stabbed and slaughtered in the most brutal
ways, men and women, old people and small children, without distinction. With terrible sadism
they struck heads with hatchets, stabbed and shot.”296
The indiscriminatory attacks, the brutality of the murders, and the shock of being
attacked by local Lithuanians in such ways were traumatic realizations for Jews, as it all
contradicted what they had known, or thought they had known, about interethnic relations in
Kovno before the war. Such unprecedentedness made full comprehension of their situation
difficult, but Jews had to do the best they could to react to events as they were unfolding.
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“The Germans know law and order, the Lithuanians don’t”
Although the Germans enabled the further perpetration of the pogroms and organized the
mass killings at the forts, Jews primarily cite their fear of the Lithuanians, rather than the
Germans, and attribute primary culpability for the violence of the first period to the former.297
Furthermore, accounts frequently emphasize the Lithuanians’ more brutal, chaotic behavior.
After her family’s capture following their aborted effort to flee the city, Nechama
Shneorson noticed that the Lithuanian police and German soldiers “were already like brothers
and sisters and helped each other right away what to do. What do we do now with the Jews?”298
Before describing the aforementioned sadistic, indiscriminate attacks in Slobodka, The
Clandestine History noted that the groups of partisans had acted “with the concurrence and
blessing of the German authorities.” 299 Indeed, the Slobodka pogrom happened after SS
commander Stahlecker arrived in Kovno with the first German Security Police unit (SK 1B) in
the early morning hours of June 25. He encouraged the continuation of pogroms and met with
leaders of the “Klimaitis gang.” The group was not associated with the LAF or Provisional
Government, but consisted the primary actors responsible for killing about a thousand Jews in
the Slobodka pogroms on June 25 and 26 as well as the Lietūkis garage massacre on June 27.300
Even if the pogroms did escalate due to German license and encouragement, Waldemar Ginsburg
attributed much of the violence during this initial period to the “Lithuanian fascists which were
in league with the Nazis,” not the Germans themselves.301 He later reiterated this, emphasizing
297
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that the pogroms were “done quite independently of the German Nazi authorities.”302 The first
stage of violence ended soon after, on June 28, when the Germans disarmed the Lithuanian
partisan groups and established local police battalions, known as the TDA or National Labor
Service Battalions.303 From then on, large-scale unorganized killing did not occur within the city,
but organized mass killings occurred outside of it, at the forts. Accordingly, in his August 4 diary
entry Avraham Tory described what happened in Slobodka as a “bloody prologue.”304
On June 29 and 30, Jews who had been arrested throughout the week prior began to be
brought to the Seventh Fort, which both local Lithuanian leaders and German officials identified
as a “Jewish concentration camp.” Another “camp,” intended primarily for women and children,
was planned to open at the Ninth Fort.305 At the Seventh Fort, two separate sections were
established, for men and for women and children. The killing of Jewish men began on June 30,
and for those that continued to be held, “the days that followed turned into endless torture of the
detainees at the hands of the Lithuanian guards.”306 Both Germans and Lithuanians participated
in the atrocities at the forts, the Lithuanians in the newly established TDA battalions and
Germans from SKIb, EK3, and SS units.307 Altogether, about 5,000 Jews were killed at the
Seventh Fort, half of whom perished on July 6. Historians Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis note that
the Seventh Fort murders “constituted at that time the most extensive mass killings of unarmed
civilians in the country’s modern history.”308
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Although the killings at the forts were organized by the Germans, it is clear from
eyewitness accounts and testimonies that Lithuanians did most of the killing. Avraham Tory
recorded that at the Seventh Fort, “thousands of Jews…were slaughtered by the Lithuanian
‘freedom fighters;’ some were killed in small groups, others en masse.”309 The Clandestine
History also noted that “four to five thousand young men…perished there at the hands of the
Lithuanian partisans in horrible ways.”310 The majority of Jews killed during this initial period
were killed at the Seventh Fort, and most were men. Women and children were also taken to the
Seventh Fort and subjected to terrible conditions, but it does not appear that they were murdered
en masse.
When Jews entered the forts, they did not know that mass killings would take place.
When Anna Gure’s family was taken to the Ninth Fort, the women and men were separated upon
arrival. She remembered hearing gunfire “minutes afterwards,” but never knew if her
grandfather, father, and uncle were killed at that time or later. Although most Jewish men taken
to the forts perished there, this information was not widespread. Gure noted herself, “we didn’t
know that, you see.”311 Nechama Shneorson later reported the terrible conditions her mother and
sisters endured for a week. Throughout their imprisonment they did not know what was
happening to her father, as men and women were separated.312 Shneorson recalled that there was
hardly any food and no toilet facilities. In addition to such squalid conditions, she remembered
that every night “Germans and Lithuanians used to come in and take out women, younger
women, rape them, sometimes throw them back, and sometimes you never saw them again.” Her
mother slept on top of Shneorson’s oldest sister in order to hide and protect her each night, for
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seven nights, until they were released.313 Their mother’s actions demonstrate Jews’ ability and
determination to exercise agency even in constrained environments in order to gain a better
chance of survival for themselves and loved ones. When the Shneorson women were released
from the Seventh Fort after a week, Nechama noticed a “horrible” scent as they were leaving,
what smelled to her like a burning chicken flesh. She reflected, “in those days, being as stupid as
I was, I said, Mommy, is there somebody burning a chicken?”314 Later, she learned that they
were smelling the burning bodies of the men who had been murdered at the fort. But, at that
point, they could not have understood or known, or even contemplated that that could have been
the source of the smell.
Jews’ descriptions of Lithuanians’ actions contrast sharply with their perceptions of the
Germans once they arrived in Kovno. As Morris Rich remembered, “Not even one German took
act [sic] in the pogrom,” and goes on to distinguish the perpetrators as such: “The Germans took
later their business, systematically according to the books, and according to the orders of the
system how to kill all the Jews, you know, to exterminate the Jews…But the Lithuanians, like
butchers, they slaughter us.”315 As Margaret Kagan succinctly put it, there was a common
“feeling that the Germans know law and order, the Lithuanians don’t.”316 Some Jews felt
protected by the Germans during the pogroms. Jack Brauns felt his life was saved by the
Germans’ arrival in Kovno. As he was lined up against a wall to be shot, he heard motorcycle
noises and one of the partisans proclaimed, “The Germans are coming. We better leave right
away.” They left the scene, “leaving us with our life,” recounted Brauns.317 Although Kagan
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remembered that the Lithuanians were doing all the Germans’ “dirty work” for them, she
retained a positive memory of the Germans during this period. A Wehrmacht solider had
occupied an abandoned apartment next door to her family. He told them he disapproved of the
Lithuanians’ actions and said, “I only hope and pray they won’t send me to the front before you
are safe and sound in the ghetto.”318 Kagan felt that he “protected them” from the frenzied
Lithuanians.319 Brauns felt similarly, because his father was a well-respected, German-trained
doctor, the Wehrmacht occupied their building but did not evict his family. He recalled, “I was
protected by the German Wehrmacht [from] any bad deeds that could happen to me. No
Lithuanian would even dare to enter our apartment,” because of the Germans’ presence in their
building.320
Ultimately, after enduring a fear-filled, chaotic two weeks, Jews perceived a Ghetto as a
place of refuge from the constant threat of death. The Germans’ announcement on July 10
ordering Jews to be confined to a Ghetto was met with a sense of “relief.” Many believed that
“the pogrom had ended and now the Jewish question would be justly regulated in this or that
manner.”321 According to Avraham Tory’s July 8 diary entry, prominent Jewish community
leaders had met with German and Lithuanian leaders and determined that, for Kovno’s Jews, it
was “either the present torment or the Ghetto, there was no third option.” A footnote on the entry
adds, that Tory later recalled “the participants in the meeting had not the faintest idea what the
term ‘Ghetto’ entailed, what living there would be like, and, in general, what would happen to
the Kovno Jewish community at large. One thing was clear: the present situation was unbearable
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and must come to an end without further delay.”322 Jack Brauns described the “psychological
factor” of the Ghetto, that Jews “were happy to go to the Ghetto because they felt more secure
behind a wired fence” and hoped “that their life will improve.”323 Waldemar Ginsburg confirmed
the existence of such sentiments, explaining that due to “the state we were in, we were quite
willing to be locked in a prison to be saved from the excesses of the…Lithuanian fascists.”324
In July, in light of their experience of the last few weeks, German order was seen as an
improvement in comparison to Lithuanian disorder. Even the anti-Jewish policies that were
instituted in the following weeks before the Ghetto was closed were welcomed by Jews as a
reprieve from the chaos that abounded at the hands of the Lithuanians, whose motives and
actions could not be predicted. They had no way of knowing the full extent to which they would
continue to suffer after the Ghetto closed, although in different ways than before.

Conclusion
Kovno Jews’ new reality after June 22, 1941, was so drastically different that their prior
knowledge and understanding of Jewish life in Kovno was, unfortunately, of little help to them.
Their actions and decisions during the pogroms were thus based on personal experiences and
limited information available. Fleeing east, moving locations, or staying inside one’s home were
all decisions made with the hope they would avoid harm. In such a chaotic environment,
however, no actions guaranteed safety and chance thus played a large role. Jews demonstrated
agency not only in actions taken, but in active attempts to understand perpetrators’ motivations,
even when they seemed incomprehensible. Indeed, while Jews’ decisions and actions were
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restricted, those of the Lithuanians were not. They freely chose to participate or not in the
violence. The next chapter reveals the effects of individual Lithuanian actions on Jews and
explores a spectrum Jewish experiences, illuminating the role of chance and the intimacy of
collective violence.
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4 “An Entirely New and Utterly
Horrifying Reality”: Personal
Experiences and Perceptions of the
Pogroms
Despite historian Andrew Ezergailis’ protestations regarding Jan Gross’s use of the term
“neighbors,” the Kovno pogroms are clearly an example of “neighbors killings neighbors.”325
Even narrower meanings of the word applies in the case of Kovno, when some Jewish victims
knew their Lithuanian attacker personally or even lived next door to them. Furthermore,
“neighbors” appears in contemporary written accounts such as Avraham Tory’s diary and The
Clandestine History and is used in postwar oral histories recorded a few years before Gross’s
Neighbors popularized the term. In The Clandestine History, its authors lamented that, by the
announcement of the creation of a Ghetto, Kovno’s Jews “had already put up with a great deal
from our dear neighbors, the Lithuanians.”326 The use of the word in contemporary and postwar
accounts indicates how utterly intimate the pogroms were for Jews.
Still, their Lithuanian neighbors’ involvement in the pogroms was not monolithic.
Actions ranged from active participation in killing and looting to passive indifference, the latter
quality describing how the majority of Lithuanians responded during the Holocaust.327
Widespread indifference, however, suggests a degree of acquiescence that began during the
initial stages of violence. Historian Karen Sutton notes that after Lithuanians participated in the
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persecution of Jews in the summer and fall 1941 “there were hardly any recriminations by
Lithuanians against other Lithuanians who participated in actions against Jews.”328 Surely, in the
chaos of the German invasion, non-Jewish Lithuanians were also frightened and looking out for
their own well-being. However, some Lithuanians independently and actively chose to
participate in the pogroms. Furthermore, widespread indifference meant that very few
Lithuanians actively helped Jews try to survive. According to Sutton only 0.5 percent of the 10
percent of Lithuanian Jews who survived the war were helped by Gentiles.329 In the initial,
chaotic period of violence there were several examples of Jews being “saved” by Lithuanians,
but I hesitate to commend such actions, as the “rescuers” did so while participating in the
violence; they chose to “save” some Jews but readily harmed others.
While the German invasion constituted an entirely new reality for all of Lithuania, it was
most utterly horrifying for the nation’s Jews. Not only did Kovno Jews find themselves fearing
for their lives, some encountered familiar faces among their attackers and bystanders. How did
Jews’ prewar relationships with Lithuanians and personal experiences of antisemitism shape
their perceptions of their neighbors’ participation in the pogroms? Did Jews’ prewar contacts
with Lithuanians help them avoid harm? What kinds of interactions between Jews and non-Jews
were deadly, and which ones were lifesaving? And can these experiences tell us anything about
the motives of rescuers, even if erstwhile rescuers? If only a minority of Lithuanians participated
in the pogroms, what were the roles and responsibilities of the majority of Lithuanians in Kovno
and how were they perceived by Jews?

328
329

Sutton, The Massacre of the Jews of Lithuania, 128.
Sutton, The Massacre of the Jews of Lithuania, 130.

93

“Betrayed”
Compounding the unprecedented terror of the pogroms was the sense of abandonment
and betrayal that Jews felt being attacked by fellow Lithuanian citizens. In chapter 3, we saw
how Margaret Kagan’s family hid in a cellar while the Germans bombed targets outside the city.
Kagan recalled the “changing attitudes” from the Gentile neighbors also hiding in the cellar. She
had never before “felt unloved or discriminated against” because she was Jewish, but clearly
remembered sensing her Gentile neighbors’’ “animosity for the first time.”330 Both Jack Brauns
and Morris Rich also felt as if a sudden reversal took place. Brauns recalled, “we had great
neighbors, Lithuanians…We never had a problem with them, ‘til the Holocaust.” 331 Rich
remembered that Jews were “very friendly” with non-Jews in his neighborhood. He then
qualified his statement, saying, “it turns out, when the war starts, we didn’t know they were not
friendly.”332
Both Brauns and Rich had recognized that antisemitism existed in Kovno, but they did
not understand what had facilitated the disintegration of Jews’ personal relationships with nonJews, which was thus perceived as abrupt. Similarly, the authors of The Clandestine History
questioned, “It would seem that there had been so many friends of the Jews among the
Lithuanians. Where were they all?” The account then explained, that during the pogroms “the
most disgusting and shameful deeds were done to us…and there was no one to raise his voice on
our behalf.” If Jews had been aware how antisemitic some Lithuanians were, then perhaps their
participation in the pogroms would have not been a total surprise. Yet it was the lack of help
extending to apathy from their neighbors and those they had believed to be friends that was
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perhaps more distressing. Jews were dismayed to have observed, “on the part of many
intelligent, previously quite decent Lithuanians such lack of understanding of the situation of the
Jews, such lack of empathy, such lack of desire to help.”333 Some Jews had ascertained that the
Soviets’ retreat left Jews vulnerable and they were being targeted and killed as “communists,”
but it was more difficult to understand why Lithuanian hostility and indifference was so
widespread, even amongst those not actively participating in the pogroms.
For Jack Brauns, the realization of the Jews’ new reality was so disturbing because he
had grown up feeling secure and part of Lithuanian society. “Suddenly, I was betrayed from the
same people that I lived with, that I trusted, that were my neighbors,” he recalled decades
later.334 As someone who had characterized her family as “part of the Lithuanian establishment,”
and who had not experienced antisemitism growing up, Margaret Kagan remembered, “I was
shattered by the generality of the antisemitic excesses. I was flabbergasted.”335 More broadly,
even for those Jews less integrated that Brauns and Kagan, The Clandestine History asserted
“that the entire Jewish attitude toward the Lithuanian nation was shaken.”336 Jews’ relatively
positive prewar relationships with Lithuanians and minimal personal experiences of antisemitism
meant they felt totally forsaken in the situation unfolding after the war broke out.

Targeted Attacks
Jews’ prewar relationships with Gentiles were not predictive of whether they would be
harmed or not by Lithuanians during the pogroms. Anna Gure recalled how the Germans did not
“know who was Jewish and who was not,” yet the Lithuanians knew the Jews “very well,” which
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enabled them to do “a magnificent job” targeting them. 337 As previously stated, she believed
Lithuanian partisans came to her family home because “they knew who was there.”338 However,
she did not indicate whether she knew them personally. Morris Rich’s family was targeted by
someone familiar: their next-door neighbor, Mr. Mazuras, with whom they were friendly. He did
not have a telephone, so people used to call the Riches’ house and someone would go to Mr.
Mazuras to tell him he had a phone call. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Rich’s family
believed that Mazuras was some sort of “organizer,” and after the invasion, he was responsible
for distributing weapons to Lithuanian partisans.339 After the invasion began, Mazuras came over
to Rich’s house asking for “Chaim,” Morris Rich’s father, but he was not there; the elder Rich
had likely been captured already by other partisans. Rich believed that his neighbor came over
because “he had hate against my father” and would have killed him if he was at home.340
As also previously mentioned in chapter 3, Morris Rich’s other relatives also could not be
found by those who sought them out. At his grandmother’s house, while his relatives hid in the
cellar, they heard people enter the house. One of the voices the hidden Jews overheard belonged
to a Gentile woman who had taken care of Rich’s grandmother, “a woman who knew all the
people in Slobodka” and who “used to eat [at] the same table” with members of the Rich family
“for years and years.” 341 When the intruders did not find any Jews in the house, the woman
suggested they might be hiding in the new synagogue, something she might have known because
she knew many Jews in the area. She proclaimed, “let’s go there.” According to Rich, the Jews in
the nearby synagogue were subsequently murdered.342 Interethnic integration and personal
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relationships in interwar Lithuania had mitigated Jews’ experiences and fears of antisemitism. In
the chaotic environment of the pogroms, these provided no guarantee of protection, and could
even enable targeted violence.

Selective “Saving”
While ethnic Lithuanians targeted some Jews familiar to them, others selectively “saved”
Jews they did know. In many cases, however, these perpetrators went on to indiscriminately
target other Jews. Prewar integration helped some Jews when their lives were in peril and
survival depended on the whim and will of an individual Lithuanian. When Morris Rich’s
neighbor Mazuras came to his home and did not find Rich’s father, he told the remaining Rich
family members, “I’m going to tell my partisans not to touch your house,” yet he still sought out
and murdered other Jews.343 The family friend who later told Rich of his father’s fate was also
“saved” when he was recognized by a Lithuanian who was preparing to kill a group of Jews at
the Seventh Fort. The family friend, Melamed, was standing in a group of Jews to be shot, when
a partisan recognized him. According to Rich, the Lithuanian “gave the order not to shoot that
group [of] people,” called out Melamed, and “gave an order to release him.”344 Similarly, Anna
Gure’s father was also recognized at the Seventh Fort by a Lithuanian and released. She recalled
“it was supposed to be that all Jews are communists,” but the man “knew my father wasn’t a
communist” and sent Gure, her father, and uncle home. 345 Alas, this would only be delay their
fate, as her male family members were killed the following week.
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In such a chaotic environment, luck played a considerable role in survival. Even within
one family, some family members were “saved” while others were not. After Margaret Kagan’s
father left and never returned, her mother went to the Red Cross office to see if she could locate
her son, as he had not yet returned from summer camp. Kagan’s mother was arrested by a
partisan who, after finding the jails full of arrested Jews, took her to the temporary headquarters
of the partisans. She was told that normally first they rape Jewish women, then shoot them.
According to Kagan, her mother heard a voice belonging to someone named Jurgis Bobelis, the
Lithuanian police chief who commanded the Lithuanian patrols responsible for arresting and
executing Jews during the pogroms.346 When Bobelis found out that “Mrs. Shtromas” (Kagan’s
mother) was being held, he told the partisans responsible for arresting her, “Are you crazy, do
you know how much Shtromas has done for Lithuania? Release her immediately.”347 Mrs.
Shtromas was subsequently released, disturbed by the experience but unharmed physically.
Kagan’s father had no such fortunate encounter.
Although he “saved” Kagan’s mother, Colonel Bobelis had made the radio announcement
ordering one hundred Jews to be shot for every German that Kagan overheard while hiding in the
cellar. Dieckmann and Sužiedėlis relate that following that announcement, “the pogrom-filled
atmosphere reached fever pitch.”348 Bobelis’ contradictory actions further illustrate the role of
“luck,” the severe restriction of Jews’ agency, and the unpredictability of the pogroms. If he had
not arrived and recognized Kagan’s mother, she might not have survived.
The assertion of one’s Lithuanian identity sometimes resulted in being “saved,” even
without personally knowing Lithuanian perpetrators. According to Nechama Shneorson, her
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father was able to escape death after showing proof of his military service.349 He took the chance
of telling one of the Lithuanians, “you are going to kill now a man that was fighting for the
independence of Lithuania.” He then produced a medal and his military papers proving that he
had volunteered to fight in the Lithuanian army.350 The Lithuanian looked at his papers and,
noting that Shneorson’s father was higher ranking, declared, “Let’s go.” He told him, “I’m going
to put you in another jail. I want to take you away from all this.” Her father protested that the
man would also have to take the other Jews as well. “If you're not helping them the way you're
going to help me, then I don’t want to be left alive either,” was her father’s plea. The entire
group, about thirty-seven people, was removed from the Seventh Fort, alive. After being taken to
another jail, Shneorson’s mother was able to plead with the authorities to get him released.351 In
rare situations such as Shneorson’s father experienced, the disorder of the Lithuanian pogroms
proved to be an asset and allowed some Jews to assert their sense of agency, at great personal
risk, by demonstrating their “Lithuanian-ness.”
Anna Gure told a similar story. While her male relatives were ultimately killed at the
Ninth Fort, Gure says she and her female family members were among those released from there.
One of the Lithuanian guards asked if any of the women there had male family members who
had fought for Lithuanian independence. Gure’s mother told him that her brother had worked in
the Lithuanian embassy in Berlin. They were consequently let go.352 It is unknown if they would
have been killed otherwise. It is notable, however, that questions about defending Lithuanian
independence were asked at all, demonstrating that Jewish integration in interwar Lithuanian
society could help Jews them avoid harm, but it was no guarantee.
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While the actions of erstwhile rescuers cannot be commended, such examples are
indicative that, in some cases, integration might overcome dehumanization. It is more difficult to
engage in violence when it still possible to recognize the victim as an individual human, either as
a former friend or fellow Lithuanian. Unfortunately, in cases of neighbors killing neighbors, it
appears rage, resentment, or opportunism were more powerful.

Opportunism and Indifference
The majority of Lithuanians neither killed nor saved Jews. As Margaret Kagan observed,
“I am sure, and I am convinced, that it is a small minority of people who are always able to do
the most ghastly, the most terrible things, when it comes to circumstances like that.”353 Although
they might not have participated in the violence themselves, the pogroms provided opportunities
for Lithuanians to capitalize on the violence fomented by others. Sonia Stern’s family had
attempted to flee the invasion but were forced to turn back. When they returned after two or three
days, they discovered that their Lithuanian neighbors had moved into their house. They told
Stern’s family that it was not their house anymore, that “you Jews have nothing anymore,
nothing belongs to you anymore,” and threatened to call “the Gestapo.” With little choice to do
otherwise, the family abandoned their home; the new residents would not even let them take
food, belongings, or a family picture because its’ frame was valuable.354 In this same period,
Margarete Kagan learned from a friend that two Lithuanian boys whom she had gone to school
with had been overheard discussing if they could go to Kagan’s house to loot it. She recalled, “I
was shocked that they would even contemplate doing it.”355 They did not go through with it, but
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even the fact they would consider doing so exemplifies the sense of freedom and opportunism
some Lithuanians felt amidst the pogroms, and the sense of fear this imbued in Kovno’s Jews.
Even Lithuanian indifference was hurtful, psychologically if not physically. When
Kagan’s family’s flat was looted, they were taken out into the street and forced to line upon
against a wall. She says non-Jewish neighbors looked down from above, whispering to each
other, “They will shoot them, they will shoot them at any moment.” She remembers thinking she
would rather be killed than wounded, but “they raided and took whatever they wanted and let us
go back in.”356 Her comments reveal the sense of hopelessness created in such a chaotic situation
when an individual’s sense of agency is severely restricted, when one is experiencing an entirely
new and utterly horrifying reality. Death would have seemed as the only way to escape from an
otherwise inescapable situation.

Helping
Some neighbors killed, others looted, and most others remained indifferent. In the more
than two dozen testimonies I examined, there are few mentioned instances of Lithuanians
genuinely helping Jews during the pogroms. When Charles Anolik was asked if his father’s nonJewish work associates tried to help his family, he responded definitively, “No. Right away we
were just all by ourselves.”357 Still, he did recount that a woman who worked for the family as a
maid brought them food while they were sheltering in their home during the pogroms.358
Abraham Resnick’s family was also “fortunate.” A Lithuanian, their apartment manager, helped
them. He warned the family when it was safe to go outside to get food, “or when we should stay
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away.” According to Resnick, their “destiny was in his hands.”359 This is apparently not an
overstatement. The Clandestine History similarly asserted that building managers “played a
decisive role” during the pogroms. The “fate” of the Jews living in a building “was sealed” if a
manager was opportunistic and conspired with Lithuanian looters.360
Remarkably, Jack Brauns’s family was offered protection from the “chief of police” in
Kovno, who was a friend of his father. Brauns cannot recall the man’s name but says he “came to
our house and told us that we could come to hide in his house any time,” reasoning that “he
couldn’t conceive that anybody will come to look for us in his house.” Brauns’s father refused
the offer, but Brauns remembered the man as “very generous,” as he later brought food to the
family. When telling this story, Brauns commented, “There were a lot of great people,” meaning
non-Jews.361 For example, he cited help the family received from their maid who brought his
family food when it was not safe for Jews to go outside. She also was entrusted with Brauns’s
mother’s fur coat and gold items, which she returned after the war. He says her actions “showed
there were a lot of decent people who behaved decently and risked a lot.”362 Other Jews may not,
and do not, make the same claims of widespread Lithuanian decency as he does. It is
indeterminable if his family benefited because they were extremely privileged and wellconnected compared to other Jews in Kovno, or if they simply knew kinder Lithuanians.
Regardless, Brauns’ family was fortunate to have experienced such help. Most Jews were not
offered protection or aid from their Gentile friends.
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Not All Lithuanians, But All Jews
Just as individual Jews experienced and perceived the pogroms differently, they
remembered the pogroms differently decades later. Remembrance of Lithuanian participation
and attribution of blame is complicated, and there can be no unbiased assessments by those who
lived through such terror. Yet, survivors themselves tried to mitigate their assignment of blame
to Lithuanians, perhaps to reconcile their new reality with their old. Before remarking that the
“whole country went crazy” after June 22, Sonia Stern emphasized that she and her family had
non-Jewish neighbors, classmates, customers, and friends.363 She initially began to say that after
the war broke out “the whole Gentile population…” and then stopped herself mid-sentence,
amending that “I cannot say all of them, there [were] some that tried to save Jewish lives;” albeit,
“very few.”364
Margaret Kagan warned of the importance of not assigning blame to all Lithuanians. She
emphasized that not all of them are “Jew killers,” likening that generalization to how antisemites
perceive Jews, as a monolithic people. She subsequently avowed that she is a “great believer in
judging individuals, not nations.” 365 Again, while not all Lithuanians actively participated in the
pogroms, all Jews in Kovno experienced the trauma of those events perpetuated by a minority of
Lithuanians.
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Conclusion
Eyewitness accounts convey the intimacy of the pogroms. It was a different kind of
persecution than what Jews would later experience. They felt violated: they were attacked in
their own city, sometimes in their own homes. They felt betrayed: they were targeted by their
neighbors. They felt abandoned: most of their Lithuanian friends and neighbors remained
indifferent to their suffering. In comparison to such widespread negative experiences, the few
instances of being “saved” or receiving aid seems negligible. However, such acts were not
inconsequential. Although infrequent, lives were saved. The choices of Lithuanians to act or not
act continue to color Jews reactions to the unfolding pogroms and their remembrances of events
decades later.
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Conclusion
Approximately 35–40,000 Jews lived in Kovno before June 22, 1941. Only 3,000–3,500
survived the war, thus the fate of the city’s Jews aligns with the fact that about 90 percent of all
Lithuanian Jews perished during the Holocaust. Approximately 80 percent of the country’s Jews
had already been killed by the end of 1941, within six months of the German invasion of the
Soviet Union.366 In Kovno approximately 6,000 Jews were killed in the first two weeks after
June 22. Victims of the Holocaust are often reduced to numbers, dates, places, and statistics.
While such information reveals the scale of mass murder, it does not convey the fact that it was
also personal in that individual lives and families were destroyed. My work has aimed to honor
the individual victims, their voices, and their experiences. Doing so is one of the only ways to
attempt to capture the horrific nature of these events. If the horror of the Holocaust can still seem
incomprehensible in hindsight, it is important to attempt to understand how it was comprehended
by those experiencing the events as they were unfolding. The victim perspective presents a
humanized illustration of the intimate nature of the violence Jews experienced in Kovno.
This thesis used eyewitness accounts to explain what Kovno Jews expected to happen
after the German invasion and why their reality was so unforeseeably different. In order to
highlight the unprecedented nature of the pogroms, it examined “what was known and what
could have been known” about Jewish life in interwar Kovno. Overall, Jews felt secure in
independent Lithuania. Although levels of integration varied and most Jews acknowledged the
existence of or experienced antisemitism, it was accepted as an enduring condition of Jewish life
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in Lithuania. That Jews in Kovno had “a good life,” as characterized by Anna Gure, was
especially true in comparison to the experiences of Jews in Germany in the mid-to-late 1930s
and Nazi-occupied Poland after 1939. Although information on the Nazis’ activities was limited
or often dismissed as rumors, there was the sense that whatever was happening to Jews in those
places would not befall the Jews in Kovno. This “complacency,” as identified by Waldemar
Ginsburg, persisted through the year of Soviet occupation, during which some Jews were more
fearful of Soviet arrests and deportations than a potential impending Nazi invasion.
After uncovering what Jews could have expected to happen after the German invasion –
that is, they could not have expected violence to come first from local Lithuanians– we saw how
Jews acted when “confronted with an entirely new and utterly horrifying reality.” During the
pogroms, Jews had to rely on previous knowledge and experiences in their evaluation of
unfolding events to guide their actions and decisions. Yet everything they had known about what
it meant to be a Jew in Kovno changed overnight on June 22, 1941, when trouble came from an
unexpected direction. While facing “the ever-present danger of death” at the hands of local
Lithuanians, Jews exercised agency in their attempts to comprehend the perpetrators’
motivations and develop survival strategies according to their perceptions and experiences
during the pogroms. Not only were Jews shocked by the Lithuanians’ independent instigation of
violence, but the cruelty exhibited during the pogroms furthered their terror. Therefore, some
Jews perceived the arriving Germans relatively more positively since their initial actions restored
order in the city.
Kovno Jews felt betrayed by their neighbors, both those who actively participated in the
violence and those who were acquiescent or indifferent bystanders. While most Jews’ previous
perceptions of interethnic relationships were shattered, others were “saved” due to their prewar
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associations or when recognized by erstwhile rescuers. Still, very few accounts reveal
experiences of receiving aid or protection during the pogroms. Although a minority of
Lithuanians participated in the violence, the indifference and passivity of the majority was just as
harmful to Kovno Jews, both to their physical safety and to their psyche. Not only did their
neighbors not offer aid or shelter to help their chances of survival, remembrances of such
abandonment endure for survivors.
The June 27 Lietūkis Garage massacre is perhaps the most well-known event of the
Kovno pogroms. The photographs which exist exemplify much of what stood out to Jews who
experienced the pogroms—the brutality of a small number of Lithuanian perpetrators and the
support, acquiescence, or indifference of the majority of Lithuanians. This thesis has sought to
move beyond examining such landmark events, first in examining the initial period of violence
as an event in itself, not as a “prelude” to future stages of persecution, and second in analyzing
the various victim accounts to reveal details on individuals’ initial traumatic experiences and
related responses. Contemporary “official” accounts, such as Avraham Tory’s diary and The
Clandestine History, recorded the collective Jewish experience. Each detailed how events
unfolded and revealed how Jews responded and adapted to their new, constantly shifting reality.
Postwar oral histories provide details of how individuals confronted that reality and highlight the
contrast between life in Kovno before and after June 22, 1941. Individual accounts reveal the
concurrent roles of agency and luck in survival and interacted in the unpredictable, chaotic
environment of the pogroms. Survivor accounts may benefit from hindsight, but they also show
that even decades after traumatic events it is hard to fully comprehend what happened, even for
those who went through it.
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The victim perspective indirectly and unintentionally sheds a different light on
perpetrators. The local Lithuanians who attacked Jews were not all virulent antisemites. Many
had known and unproblematically interacted with Jews in interwar Lithuania. When given the
license to do so, however, those who were opportunistic, resentful, or motivated by any variety
of reasons, attacked unprotected, readily identified scapegoats. The intention of much of the
literature reviewed in Chapter 1 was to create a framework for understanding the source of the
violence that the Kovno Jews experienced. Scholars have illuminated the ways in which
perceived differences amongst groups be exacerbated in times of instability and activated in
times of crisis to direct violence at “the other.” Chapter 2 essentially explored whether Jews
perceived themselves as “other.” Most did not, yet many Lithuanians must have believed so, thus
contributing to their readiness to participate in the pogroms or their unwillingness to take action
to help Jews. Thus, as demonstrated in Kovno, interethnic integration alone does not prevent the
onset of collective violence. The “Judeo-Bolshevik myth” and associated antisemitic sentiments
persisted in the minds of many Lithuanians, even as Jews and Gentiles lived next to each other,
worked with each other, and sat near each other in classrooms. When such latent hostilities were
unleashed, the violence was directed by (mis)perceptions of Jews. Yet the violence Jews
experienced was very real.
In concluding remarks for her USC Shoah Foundation video testimony, Margaret Kagan
asserted that “we need to educate people” and “tell them this can happen, very easily,” that evil
“happens imperceptibly.”367 The imperceptibility of the potency of latent antisemitic hatreds
before June 22 1941, is part of what made the pogroms so utterly horrifying. How easily the
Lithuanians turned against or turned their backs on the Jews amplified their sense of shock.
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Evil and hatred will always exist. Sociopolitical crises will always occur. People will
always be scared and seek to blame “others;” and there will always be those, although perhaps a
minority, who will act on such emotions. Therefore, it is imperative that scholars, educators, and
societal leaders continue to work to ensure that differences are not seen as threatening, and to
promote tolerance. Although perhaps imperceptible to most or deemed inconsequential, the
existence of latent prejudices in our society is not benign. They can easily be manipulated during
times of crisis to unite “us” against “them.” These same forces directed individuals to attack
places of worship in Christchurch, New Zealand and Poway, California in the present-day and
incited the eruption of much larger scale violence in Kovno, Lithuania in the past. It is important
to study the initial phases of violence and the victims’ experiences so that that no future
populations have to experience such an “entirely new and utterly horrifying reality” as the Jews
in Kovno did in June 1941.
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